Chapter 15

Biopower and Control

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Introduction

What is the relationship between Foucault's concept of biopower and Deleuze's concept of control? Despite the similarities between these two concepts, there is not a single scholarly article that solely thematizes this question, nor a comparative survey of the answers given so far. This essay aims to fill this lacuna. Despite the lack of a full-length interrogation of this question, scholars have taken up several different positions on the relationship between these two concepts. While some distinguish the two concepts based on the content of what they act on (biopower on life vs control on economics), others distinguish them based on the different formal characteristics of how each type of power operates (biopower by management vs control by modulation). These two positions are then subdivided with respect to whether these differences between biopower and control are complementary or oppositional. Finally, a third position argues that biopower and control are both similar and different. The following essay aims to assess and resolve this question with the aide of Deleuze's recently transcribed course lectures on Michel Foucault (1985–6).

But why is there such scholarly division over the relation between these two concepts? At least one explanation for this is that Deleuze only writes about this concept in any length once in 1990, in a short essay entitled, "Postscripts on the Societies of Control." In this essay Deleuze clearly contrasts control with disciplinary power and suggests that Foucault had also moved beyond disciplinary power in his later work. While this suggests some sort of correlation between biopower and control (both coming after disciplinary power), Deleuze makes no mention of their relationship in this text. The other place one would expect to see a direct comparison of these two concepts is in Deleuze's book on Foucault – but with only a couple mentions of biopower in this book, Deleuze offers no satisfactory comparisons with the idea of control. If they were the same, surely Deleuze would

have said so, right? Perhaps Deleuze's equivocation in these texts is why the different scholarly positions on biopower and control can all agree on one thing: biopower is not the same as control.

Interestingly, however, Deleuze did compare these two concepts, just not in these texts. One of the more valuable contributions of Deleuze's recently transcribed course lectures on Foucault is that Deleuze offers several hours' worth of direct comparison of biopower and control, that unfortunately never made it into any of his published works. What we find in these lectures from 8 and 15 April 1986 is that Deleuze not only entirely equates biopower and control, but also attributes their shared origin to William Burroughs' essay "The Limits of Control," published in 1975. One year before Foucault introduces the concept of biopower in *La volonté de savoir* (1976), Deleuze claims, based on personal knowledge, that Foucault was "profoundly struck by Burroughs' analysis of social control."[1] In fact, Foucault and Burroughs even presented on the same conference panel on 14 November 1975 at the Semiotext(e) Schizo-Culture colloquium at Columbia University. Burroughs' paper was entitled "The Impasses of Control," and Foucault's was entitled "We are not Repressed." Based on Burroughs' concept of control, Deleuze claims, Foucault develops the idea of biopower.

Can it be that biopower and control are the same? Or is Deleuze making a Foucauldian monster? Do biopower and control define power over the same content? Do they both have all the same formal characteristics? While scholars on this question have laid out three different answers to these questions, the aim of this essay is to argue for a fourth position. The thesis of this essay is thus that biopower and control are the same concept of power in both content and form. In order to defend this thesis, this essay is divided into three main sections. The first section begins by laying out the three scholarly positions adopted thus far on this question and the textual support offered for each position. Once we understand these arguments and their basis in the published works of Deleuze, the second section then compares these positions with the account offered by Deleuze in his 1986 lectures on Foucault. Finally, the third section examines the content and formal characteristics of both biopower and control in this light, ultimately arguing that the two concepts are, and were always, meant to describe the same type of power.

I. Biopower vs Control

The arguments for the difference between biopower and control can be grouped into three distinct types: the argument based on their difference in content, the argument based on their difference in form, and finally, the argument based on their overlap. The aim of this first section is to consider each of these arguments in turn

and what textual support is offered in favor of each. Once this is accomplished we can then see, in the next section, if Deleuze's recently transcribed lectures shed any new light on these arguments or not.

Life vs economics

The first argument for the difference between biopower and control is that they refer to different types of content. Biopower, it is argued, is defined by "the political control over life and living beings," while control is defined by explicitly economic and informational content. Steven Shaviro, for example, argues in his essay "The 'Bitter Necessity' of Debt: Neoliberal Finance and the Society of Control" that "far from focusing on biopower or biopolitics, Foucault abandons this direction of his thought"[2] in favor of an economic analysis of neoliberalism in his (1978–9) Collège de France lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Shaviro quotes Foucault's description of this power as "the image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes."[3] Thus, for Shaviro, Foucault's abandonment of the concept of biopower marks a theoretical step forward, as well as a step closer to Deleuze's own concept of control societies similarly defined by neoliberal economics. "Both Foucault, in his analysis of neoliberalism, and Deleuze, in his analysis of the control society," Shaviro concludes, "insist upon what I can only call an *economism* at the heart of postmodernity."[4]

I would like to highlight two important points in Shaviro's argument. The first is that Shaviro defines biopower exclusively by its political content: life. For Shaviro, it seems that biopower has no formal characteristics. Or if it does, they are not essential to its definition. This creates an interesting absence of nomenclature for the new concept of non-biopolitical economic power developed in *The Birth of Biopolitics*. The second is that not only are biopower and control different, they are also mutually exclusive. Shaviro argues that

> [Foucault] suggests – contrary to so much of the theorizing that has been done in his name in the years since his death – that we cannot understand contemporary society in terms of the supposed postulation of 'life' as a target and focus of power. We need to follow the proliferation of market logic instead.[5]

Not only are they mutually exclusive, economic power is a clear theoretical advancement over the analysis of biopower. In fact, Shaviro goes as far as to claim that biopolitical analysis cannot understand contemporary society at all.

Shaviro is not the only one to have defined biopower exclusively or even just primarily by the content to which it refers: life. In the *History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Foucault himself defines biopower as a "political power [that] had assigned itself the

task of administering life,"[6] and "brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations."[7] In his (1975–6) lectures, *Society Must be Defended*, Foucault defines biopower as the government of "man in so far as he is a living being."[8] The definition of biopower as the government over living beings has now spread across academic disciplines.

Control, on the other hand, according to Deleuze's published works, is not defined solely by the content of life. Shaviro argues that control is primarily a theory of economic power, and Antonio Negri even describes it as primarily a theory of informational, communicational, or digital power.[9] In both of these cases control is understood as a power over the non-living. Control is defined as non-biopower. Despite their shared agreement on the content-based difference between biopower and control, Shaviro and Hardt and Negri draw opposite conclusions from this difference. For Shaviro, this difference renders biopower outmoded and useless, whereas for Hardt and Negri this is precisely what makes them complementary. "The society of control," they say, "is able to adopt the biopolitical context as its exclusive terrain of reference."[10] Thus, in this first definition biopower and control are different because biopower is the government over the living and control is the government over the non-living.

Management vs modulation

The second argument for the difference between biopower and control is that they have different formal characteristics. Biopower, it is argued, is defined by "the *management* of living beings," while control is defined by "a *modulation*, indifferent to life." Joshua Kurz, for example, argues in his essay "(Dis)locating Control: Transmigration, Precarity and the Governmentality of Control," that "what we are seeing [in contemporary politics] is not a 'population management' paradigm (i.e. bio-politics), but one of 'population modulation' (i.e. control)."[11] "Management," according to Kurz,

> is teleological, outcome-oriented; it is about accomplishing goals set along a predetermined path toward a predetermined end. Modulation, however, is about speed, the amplification or sublimation of turbulence, rhythm; it is about amplifying and redirecting flows whose cause exists outside of the purview of modulation. In short, modulation has no goals, no plan . . . Management and modulation are qualitatively different.[12]

With respect to immigration politics, "biopower," according to Kurz, "is predicated upon a system of enclosures that presume impermeable borders – even if they do not exist in practice."[13] Control, on the other hand, "is no longer about reinforcing

the space of enclosure (i.e. US border sanctity), but instead 'thins' the population selectively."[14] This shift in contemporary governance is precisely why, according to Kurz, "Foucault's lectures on *The Birth of Biopolitics* and Deleuze's essay on control largely ignore the term 'biopolitics' and instead, respectively, focus on neoliberalism and the transition from discipline to control."[15]

I would like to flag two important points in Kurz's argument. First, not only is there a qualitative difference in form between biopower and control (management vs modulation), there is also a categorical difference in content (life and populations vs indifference to life and populations).[16] Biopower and control, according to Kurz, are different in every respect and are exclusive: what we are seeing is thus *not* biopower, *but* control. Second, however, only lines later, Kurz claims that control is "primarily *indifferent towards life* . . . except only when it is strategically useful to be otherwise."[17] This raises a couple of questions unanswered by Kurz: does control take life to be the subject of its control or not? When it does, does it then take the formal character of biopower or does it continue the formal process of modulation? Does it change in content or in form? In either case the divisions Kurz has erected are undermined. It seems to me there is an equivocation as to whether these two forms of power are exclusive or complementary, and in what sense they are so.

Matters are only made more complicated when Kurz favorably cites a chart of social power published by John Protevi on his website, which does not seem to allow for the possibility of the overlapping content that Kurz argues for. Protevi's chart shows biopower beginning in 1850 and continuing to the present, and control beginning in 1980 and continuing to the present. In this way Protevi offers an unequivocally complementarist position. According to Protevi's chart, biopower and control are different in form and content and yet complementary and overlapping only *in history*. The only similarity they have in common is that they exist temporally from 1980 onward. Biopower and control thus act on their own respective content according to their own formal characteristics and never merge or overlap with respect to them. Protevi's chart shows biopower's theory of power to be based on governmentality, control's to be based on neoliberalism. Where the primary actor of biopower is the subject, the primary actor of control is the self-entrepreneur.[18] Across eleven categories, Protevi maintains that biopower and control are different.

Just as the argument for the difference between the content of biopower and control had its exclusivist position in Shaviro and complementarist position in Hardt and Negri, so the argument for formal difference has its exclusivist position in Kurz (even if this is not consistently so) and its complementarist position in Protevi (even if this is only historical). But Kurz is not the only one to equivocate on the similarities between biopower and control.

Context and intensification

Thus, the third argument for the difference between biopower and control is that they are both similar and different. This position is equivocal because its proponents are not clear as to what these particular similarities and differences are exactly. The first proponents of this position are Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri. They write together in their book *Empire*, that biopower is the "context," "terrain of reference," or "realm" in which the new paradigm of control societies take place. "The society of control," they say, "is able to adopt the biopolitical context as its exclusive terrain of reference."[19] "In the passage from disciplinary society to the society of control," they say, "a new paradigm of power is realized which is defined by the technologies that reorganize society as a realm of biopower."[20] Finally, they say, "these concepts of the society of control and biopower both describe central aspects of the concept of Empire."[21]

These passages give rise to several questions left unanswered in *Empire*. What exactly are the concrete or formal differences between these clearly different concepts so central to Empire? What does it mean for biopower to be the context or terrain of control? Does this mean that biopower came first and control later? Does this mean that biopower is the content which is acted on by the form of control? If so, does this mean that biopower and control are both defined by the same content of life and populations?

Despite their equivocation about the similarities and differences between biopower and control, Hardt and Negri do offer us a clear account of the invention of the concept of control. While the transition from discipline to control was only implicit in Foucault, they say, Deleuze renders it explicit.[22] Does this suggest that Foucault had not conceived of a form of power after discipline? Surely, that ignores Foucault's creation of the concept of biopower. Or are Hardt and Negri suggesting instead that biopower is the same as control only implicitly, and Deleuze just makes this explicit? This, however, would seem to contradict Hardt and Negri's position that the two concepts are different: one being the terrain of the other. Again, the answers to these sorts of questions are not at all clear.

This same type of equivocation is continued in a slightly different way in Jeffrey Nealon's book, *Foucault Beyond Foucault* (2007). In a section of his book titled, "Through (Foucaultian) Biopower to (Deleuzean) Control," Nealon argues that control is a Foucauldian "intensification" of both discipline and biopower into a whole new form of power. He says,

> following the Foucaultian logic of power we've been developing here, as societies of control extend and intensify the tactics of discipline and biopower (by linking training and surveillance to evermore-minute realms of everyday life), they also give birth to a whole new form.[23]

These passages raises several questions. First, the title of the section seemed to indicate that we were moving from Foucauldian biopower to Deleuzian control, and now the above passage indicates that this move takes place entirely within Foucault's own logic of the intensification of power. The argument here seems to be that the concept of control is Foucault's concept. Nealon then claims that "Deleuze further elaborates on the Foucaultian distinction between discipline and control."[24] So the argument here seems to be that Foucault invents the idea of control (contrasted with discipline and/or biopower?) and Deleuze simply elaborates on it. Thus, my second question, how much does Deleuze elaborate it? Does Deleuze elaborate it so much that it becomes something substantially different from biopower and thus non-Foucauldian? Or are they exactly the same concept just elaborated with different examples? Further, if Foucault had really invited the concept of control, why does Nealon leave this type of power missing in his chart of power on page 45, which shows only biopower from 1850 to the present and no mention of control? In all of these claims Nealon offers no textual support from Foucault saying that biopower was intensified into the concept of control. The only one who talks about control as a type of power is Deleuze.

While Hardt and Negri claim that biopower is the "terrain" of control, and Nealon claims that control is an "intensification" of biopower, in both cases it remains entirely unclear what the exact similarities and differences are between the two forms of power. Again, this scholarly division and equivocation is partly the result of a lack of any explicit comparison between these two concepts in the published works of Deleuze and Foucault. Thus, we turn now to Deleuze's recently transcribed 1985–6 course lectures on Foucault to help shed some light on these questions.

II. The Limits of Control

Deleuze was so affected by Foucault's death in 1984, that he began writing a book on him immediately. When asked why he wanted to write such a book, Deleuze was quite clear, "it marks an inner need of mine, my admiration for him, how I was moved by his death, and his unfinished work."[25] Deleuze's desire for some kind of reconciliation with Foucault seems to have been a mutual one. According to Didier Eribon, one of Foucault's most heartfelt wishes, knowing that he would not live long, was to reconcile with Deleuze.[26] After speaking at Foucault's funeral, Deleuze's book project on Foucault began as a lecture series given at the Université de Paris VIII between 1985 and 1986. The seminars were recorded by various students on cassettes, which the Bibliothèque Nationale de France converted into digital files. But these lectures were not merely a scholarly commentary on Foucault's work. They were, in the words of Frédéric Gros, "[a] means [of] discovering the founding principles, [and] laying bare the inherent metaphysics of [his] thought."[27] "It is amaz-

ing to see," Gros admits in an interview with François Dosse, "how Deleuze, who couldn't have had any knowledge of the Collège de France lectures, was so accurate in his interpretation."[28]

Among many other insights offered by these lectures on Foucault, they are also Deleuze's most sustained description and comparison of the two concepts of biopower and control. Given the lack of such a comparison in Deleuze's published works and the subsequent division among scholarly interpretations on this topic, these lectures offer us the possibility of further clarifying the relationship between biopower and control.

But before we begin looking at the defining characteristics of biopower and control, according to Deleuze's lectures on Foucault, we should begin with the shared origin of these two concepts. We should begin with William Burroughs. "Control," according to Deleuze "is the name Burroughs gave to modern power,"[29] "and Foucault sees it fast approaching."[30] "A biopolitics of populations," Deleuze says in his 8 April lecture on Foucault,

> what can we call this third [type of power]? We call it, following the American author, Burroughs, a formation of control power. We have therefore: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and control power . . . I am authorized to say this because of Foucault's admiration and familiarity with Burroughs, even though, to my knowledge, he never spoke of him in his writings, his [influence] on him was great, notably the analyses Burroughs made of social control in modern societies after the war [WWII]. After the war this had really struck Foucault.[31]

According to Deleuze, Foucault was inspired by Burroughs' analysis of social control so much that he based the concept of biopower on it. As early as 1961, in *The Soft Machine*, Burroughs was already describing a softer and more flexible system of modern power that worked on the "thought feeling and sensory impressions of the workers."[32] Before the publication of *La Volonté de Savoir* (1976), Burroughs had also published an essay called "The Limits of Control" (1975) that described an idea of control power as a supple and non-totalizing power that works directly on *life*. "All control systems," Burroughs says, "try to make control as tight as possible, but at the same time, if they succeeded completely there would be nothing left to control . . . *Life is will* (motivation) and the workers would no longer be alive, perhaps literally." Thus control, for Burroughs, is always a limited and flexible control of life without totalizing or destroying it. "Control," he says, "needs opposition or acquiescence; otherwise, it ceases to be control." "In fact, the more completely hermetic and seemingly successful a control system is, the more vulnerable it becomes." Such a system, Burroughs continues, "would be completely disoriented and shattered by even one person who tampered with the control [system]." Thus, concession is a

crucial part of control, Burroughs writes, because "concession is still the retention of control. Here's a dime, I keep a dollar." Following Burroughs analysis of the flexible social control over life, Deleuze can then make the following claim about Foucault:

> it seems to me that it's truly a misinterpretation to make Foucault into a thinker who privileges confinement. On the contrary: sometimes he subordinates confinement to a more profound function of exteriority, and sometimes he announces the end of confinement in favor of another kind of function of control altogether, defined by open and not closed functions.[33]

"Biopolitics," according to Deleuze, is this new form of power, prefigured by Burroughs, that "manages life in numerous multiplicities and in an open space, controlling life, as a biopolitics of populations."[34]

This brings us to Deleuze's definition of biopower and control. First, how does Deleuze define the type of content that biopower and control take as their object? Biopower, Deleuze says, is defined by the "management of life and populations distributed in an open [i.e. non-totalized, or smooth (*lisse*)] space."[35] But what is a population? A population, Deleuze says, is "a large multiplicity without assignable limits."[36] "We are in the age of the biopolitics of populations," Deleuze says, "where the population can just as easily be the population of grains, sheep, vineyards, as of men; all of them can be taken as populations."[37] While the subject of sovereign power, according to Deleuze is in the end, the sovereign, (i.e. God) and the subject of discipline is man, the subject of biopower is the living within man.[38] The civil right of man is thus becoming more and more the social right of living populations. The civil contract, Deleuze says, "is a relation between a person and a person, it is not a relation at the level of a population. You can have conventions between members of a population, but you cannot have contractual relations, it's absolutely impossible."[39] Thus, contemporary illness, workers strikes, genocide, abortion, and political struggles increasingly take place not with respect to a conflict over a contract between persons, but refer to a third: the living population.

So, how does Deleuze define the content and subjects of control? "In the formations of control," Deleuze says, "power and right take for their object, life. But power and right under what form? Under the form of 'the management of life, the management of populations' or under the form of right, the social right to 'assure life in man.'"[40] Deleuze is quite clear, biopower and control are both defined by the management of living populations and their social right in open space. They have exactly the same content.

But how does Deleuze define the form of biopower and control? Both are contrasted with the enclosed spaces of disciplinary confinement and identified with the

open spaces of probability. According to Deleuze, the process of rendering probable the unpredictable is the key formal aspect that defines both biopower and control. In his 8 April lectures on Foucault, Deleuze says:

> it goes without saying that confinement is absolutely useless. What is more, it is becoming expensive, it's becoming stupid, and socially irrational. The calculus of probabilities is much better than the walls of a prison. It is a control power and no longer a disciplinary power. I think this must be said, and said equally for all the elements in Foucault.[41]

Control power, according to Deleuze, is what comes after disciplinary power and is defined by the calculus of probabilities in Foucault's work. Deleuze defines biopower in exactly the same way. "Biopolitics," Deleuze says, "never stops rendering probable, it aims to render probable the rise in birth rates, for example; it aims to oversee [*surveiller*], it is a management . . . implies a management of probable phenomena, births, deaths, marriages, etc."[42] "We see here," Deleuze continues,

> the importance of the difference between discipline and biopolitics. Biopolitics takes place in an open space of great multiplicities whose limits cannot be assigned. They are only manageable according to the calculus of probabilities, by the development of a calculus of probabilities in the sense of the social control of probabilities, probabilities of marriage in a nation, probabilities of death, probabilities of birth, etc.[43]

The age of confinement is quite different than the age of biopolitics. "The age of the biopolitics of populations," Deleuze says, is defined by

> probability scales, that replaces the assignable limits of confinement. That is to say, zones of probability. You have zones of probability for French people going on vacation to Spain, etc. There are no more limits: you have no need for limits. Do you understand why this is not confinement? The third age is no longer that of confinement. With confinement, there is no longer anything to be done, because the assignable limits are replaced by zones of frequency. It is the zones of frequency that count. Why do you need to lock people up when you know you can find them all on the highway at a given day and hour?[44]

Thus, biopolitics and control, according to Deleuze, are both defined by the management and control of probabilities: probabilities of people on vacation, of cars on the highway, as well their control through the use of a unified system of magnetic

cards. With the advent of home nursing teams, the institution is no longer one of confinement but of home monitoring and management.

In conclusion, we can locate for the first time, in Deleuze's lectures on Foucault, a clear equivalence between biopower and control in both content and form. Both take the life of populations as their object and the management of probabilities as their defining formal characteristic. These lectures thus pose interesting implications for the previous scholarly arguments for the relative or absolute differences between biopower and control. In the third and final section of this paper, I will thus examine the implications of these lectures on the three types of scholarly arguments from the first section. In this final evaluation I conclude that there is no meaningful difference between biopower and control.

III. Biopower | Control

Before looking at the implications of these lectures for the previous three scholarly arguments, it is important to note their speculative character. It must be admitted that nowhere in Deleuze or Foucault's previously published writings do we find any direct contrast between biopower and control. The scholarly arguments for the various differences between biopower and control have largely hinged on interpretive comparisons based on what Deleuze or Foucault did *not* say. For example, why does Foucault *not* talk about biopower very much in his lectures on *The Birth of Biopower*? Why does Deleuze *not* directly equate biopower and control in his essay on control societies? The arguments for the difference between biopower and control have all hinged on the absence, rather than the presence, of a direct comparison between them. Deleuze's lectures on Foucault, on the other hand, offer us the first positive comparison between these two concepts. So what can we conclude about the implication of these lectures for these three arguments for the difference between biopower and control?

The first argument we looked at was the argument that biopower and control responded to different content. Biopower, it is argued, is defined by "the political control over life and living beings," while control is defined by explicitly economic and informational content. The textual support Steven Shaviro offers for this argument is that "Foucault abandons this direction of his thought" in favor of an economic analysis of neoliberalism in his (1978–9) College de France lectures, *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Joshua Kurz uses this same argument. Not only does Foucault abandon the theory of the management of life, these authors argue, but this theory also became useless for understanding contemporary economic phenomena. The fact that Foucault says nothing about biopower in his lectures on biopolitics means that he has abandoned it.

There are three problems with this argument. First, Foucault does not abandon biopower in his lectures on neoliberalism. In fact, Foucault says precisely the opposite:

> it seems to me that the analysis of biopolitics can only get under way when we have understood this general regime that we can call the question of truth, of economic truth in the first place, within governmental reason . . . only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.[45]

Not only does Foucault not abandon the concept of biopower, the entire lecture series is devoted to providing a genealogy of its emergence in liberalism. Accordingly, the second problem with this argument is that in these lectures Foucault argues that economic rationality is fundamental to biopolitics. In fact, we cannot understand one without the other. Foucault defines both economic rationality and biopolitics as the management of unpredictable populations. Populations, as Deleuze rightly notes, include both biological and non-biological populations. Economic phenomena are thus not the opposite of living phenomena. The third problem with this argument is that it lacks any direct textual support in Deleuze's work. We find exactly the opposite claim in Deleuze's lectures on Foucault, when Deleuze says that "in the formations of control power, power and right take for their object, life . . . 'the management of life, the management of populations.'"[46] Accordingly, biopower is not a useless theory of contemporary power and control is not a theoretical advancement over it: they respond to the same content. There is clear textual support from both Deleuze and Foucault that biopower and control both take living populations as their object.

The second argument we looked at was the argument that biopower and control are defined by different formal characteristics. Biopower, it is argued, is defined by management, while control is defined by modulation. Management, according to Kurz, is teleological and defined by a system of enclosures that presume impermeable borders. Modulation, on the other hand, according to Kurz, is non-teleological and defined by the amplification and redirection of flows in open spaces.[47] Management and modulation are thus formally different.

Here again, there are three problems with this argument. First, Foucault does not define biopolitical management by enclosed spaces. In both *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault says exactly the opposite.

> This analysis is not at all the ideal or project of an exhaustively disciplinary society in which the legal network hemming in individuals is taken over and extended internally by, let's say, normative mechanisms. Nor is it a society in

> which a mechanism of general normalization and the exclusion of those who cannot be normalized is needed. On the horizon of this analysis we see instead the image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals.[48]

Biopolitics is not defined by enclosures or confinement, but by the management of fluctuating processes in an open field. Even with respect to "so-called" town planning in the eighteenth century, Foucault points out how this was not a matter of enclosure but of "the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town: resituating the town in a space of circulation."[49] The opening up of economic circulation between towns is precisely how Foucault characterizes economic liberalism: as the "the form of competition between states in an open economic and political field."[50]

The second problem with this argument is that Foucault also does not define biopolitical management as teleological. Again, he says the opposite. According to Foucault, "the first great theorist of what we could call bio-politics, bio-power," Jean-Baptiste Moheau, describes how government cannot plan society with absolute certainty in advance, but instead must respond to the fluctuation of natural givens: the milieu. "The town," Foucault says, "will not be conceived or planned according to a static perception that would ensure the perfection of the function there and then, but will open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable, and a good town plan takes into account precisely what might happen."[51] Biopolitical management thus is not a certain plan for the present, it is a potential plan for an uncertain future.

The third problem with this argument is that there is no textual support for it. In fact, this argument is directly contradicted by Deleuze, in his lectures on Foucault, as well as by Foucault himself. In his clearest articulation of this, Deleuze says: "In the formations of control, power and right take for their object, life . . . under the form of 'the management of life, the management of populations.'[52] Control is management. Bringing the three concepts of control, biopower, and management together, Deleuze says:

> We see here the importance of the difference between discipline and biopolitics. Biopolitics takes place in an open space of great multiplicities whose limits cannot be assigned. They are only manageable according to the calculus of probabilities . . . in the sense of the social control of probabilities.

Discipline normalizes closed spaces, whereas biopower and control both manage open spaces according to a calculus of probabilities. Kurz's argument is also contradicted by Foucault in his description of pastoral power, which is not a disciplinary mechanism based on the teaching of general normative principles, "but rather," a teaching "by a daily modulation, and this teaching must also pass through an observation, a supervision, a direction exercised at every moment and with the least discontinuity possible over the sheep's whole, total conduct."[53] With respect to crime, drugs, and taxes, Foucault similarly argues that instead of trying to control them absolutely through normalization, biopolitics actively controls them through a continual modulation of incentives and within probabilistic limits.

The third argument for the difference between biopower and control we looked at was the argument that there are both similarities and differences between biopower and control. In particular, biopower is said to be the "context" or "terrain" of control, according to Hardt and Negri, or that control is an "intensification" of biopower, according to Nealon. Again, there are three problems with these arguments. First, neither of these arguments state exactly what characteristics of biopower and control are shared and which are not. If biopower is the context of control or control is an intensification of biopower, this does not tell us much of anything about the difference between them. It only tells us that "there are some differences."

Second, these arguments lack textual support in Foucault's work. While Foucault does speak of biopower as an intensification of discipline, as is argued by Hardt and Negri, Foucault does not, however, speak of control as an intensification of biopower. Nealon's argument is thus a creative attempt to reconcile biopower and control in the absence of any published text from either of the authors on the subject. Hardt and Negri go even further in their speculation by suggesting that the idea was already implicit in Foucault and Deleuze just made it explicit. This is an interesting idea, but one which Hardt and Negri provide no textual support for in Foucault's work.

The third problem with both of these arguments is that their interpretations are contradicted by Deleuze's lectures on Foucault. In these lectures, as I have shown in the sections above, Deleuze identifies biopower and control in both form and content. Further, there is no place in his lectures where he contrasts them at any point. The argument that control was already implicit in Foucault's work and Deleuze just made it explicit, however, does have some merit. Although this would require some extensive textual support in Foucault, one could argue that this is precisely what Deleuze's lectures on Foucault do. But this argument is true only on the condition that the two ideas remain the same and not, as Hardt and Negri, argue, different (insofar as they argue biopower is the terrain of control). This is another point of

equivocation in Hardt and Negri's argument. Is control up to and nothing more than the explication of the idea of biopower, already at work in Foucault, or does control at some point become different enough to make biopower its terrain of action?

Conclusion

Whether Deleuze makes explicit the idea of control implicit in Foucault's concept of biopower, or Foucault makes explicit the idea of biopower in Burroughs' concept of control, the best supported textual conclusion we can make at this point in the debate is that biopower and control are synonymous in both content and form. Both take the life of populations as their content and the management of probability as their form. But the statistical control over the life of populations should not be understood in the limited sense of biological beings alone. There is also a life of the city, a life of crime, political life, economic life, etc. Foucault and Deleuze are both quite clear in their examples of biopolitics that it includes the management of city-planning, money, transportation, crime, information, communication, water, sheep, grain and the climate, just as much as it is the statistical management of human births, deaths, marriages and illness. These are all living forces insofar as they are ultimately uncertain and non-totalizable phenomena. Accordingly, they cannot be managed as individuals, but only as populations with non-assignable limits: as multiplicities, as zones of frequency.

Notes

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Lectures de Cours sur Michel Foucault (1985–1986)*, 8 April 1986. Transcribed lectures and original audio files are available at http://www.cla.purdue.edu/research/deleuze/Course%20Transcriptions.html
2. Steven Shaviro, "The 'Bitter Necessity' of Debt: Neoliberal Finance and the Society of Control," *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies* 37:1 (2011), 7.
3. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–79*, trans. Michel Senellart (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 259–60.
4. Shaviro, "The 'Bitter Necessity' of Debt," 7.
5. Ibid.
6. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 139.
7. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume 1*, 143.
8. Michel Foucault, *Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 240.
9. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 174.

10. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 24.
11. Joshua Kurz, "(Dis)locating Control: Transmigration, Precarity and the Governmentality of Control," *Behemoth: a Journal on Civilization* 5:1 (2012), 32.
12. Kurz, "(Dis)locating Control," 32.
13. Ibid. 42.
14. Ibid. 34.
15. Ibid. 33.
16. ". . . contemporary governance is no longer territorial (although it retains territorial elements), [7] nor is it directed at a bounded population (although it does not supersede population-level projects entirely), nor is it about the preservation and promotion of life (although it sometimes does this). To be more precise, there is a new diagram of power at work that is primarily indifferent towards life . . . except only when it is strategically useful to be otherwise." Ibid. 32–3.
17. Ibid. 33.
18. http://www.protevi.com/john/Foucault/powerchart.pdf
19. Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 24.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. 25.
22. Ibid. 25, and Michel Hardt, "La société mondiale de contrôle," in Éric Alliez (ed.), *Gilles Deleuze une vie philosophique* (Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, 1998), 359.
23. Jeffrey Nealon, *Foucault beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications since 1984*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 68.
24. Nealon, *Foucault beyond Foucault*, 68.
25. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 94.
26. François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 328.
27. Frédéric Gros, "Le Foucault de Deleuze: une fiction métaphysique," *Philosophie* 47 (September 1995), 54.
28. Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari*, 327. Frédéric Gros, interview with the author.
29. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 71.
30. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 178.
31. Deleuze, *Lectures de Cours sur Michel Foucault*, April 8, 1986.
32. William Burroughs, *The Soft Machine* (New York: Grove/Atlantic Inc., 2011), 93.
33. Deleuze, *Lectures de Cours sur Michel Foucault*, April 8, 1986.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid. April 15, 1986.
41. Ibid. April 8, 1986.
42. Ibid. January 14, 1986.

43. Ibid. April 8, 1986.
44. Ibid. April 8, 1996.
45. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 21–2.
46. Deleuze, *Lectures de Cours sur Michel Foucault*, April 15, 1986.
47. Kurz, "(Dis)locating Control," 32.
48. Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 259–60.
49. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977–78*, ed. and trans. Michel Senellart, François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 13.
50. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 293.
51. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 20.
52. Deleuze, *Lectures de Cours sur Michel Foucault*, April 15, 1986.
53. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 181.