BETWEEN DELEUZE AND FOUCAULT

Edited by

Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail
and Daniel W. Smith

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EDINBURGH
University Press

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Edinburgh University Press Ltd
The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson's Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ

Typeset in 10.5/13 Adobe Garamond by
IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and
printed and bound in Great Britain by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 4744 1507 1 (hardback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 1509 5 (webready PDF)
ISBN 978 1 4744 1508 8 (paperback)
ISBN 978 1 4744 1510 1 (epub)

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Acknowledgments

François Dosse, "Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship," is a slightly revised version of Chapter 17 of François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 306–30. Reprinted with the permission of François Dosse and Columbia University Press.

Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," originally appeared in Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, The Essential Works of Foucault*, Vol. 2, ed. James D. Faubion; trans. Donald F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon (New York: The New Press, 1998), 343–68. Reprinted with the permission of the publishers.

Gilles Deleuze, "Michel Foucault's Main Concepts," originally appeared in *Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975—1995*, revised edition; ed. David Lapoujade; trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York and Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 246–65. Reprinted with the permission of the publishers.

Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure" originally appeared as "Désir et plaisir," ed. François Ewald, *Magazine Littéraire* 325 (October 1994), 57–65. The translation appeared in *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 183–92. Reprinted with the permission of the publishers.

Antonio Negri, "When and How I've Read Foucault," translated by Kristopher Klotz, was originally published as "Quand et comment j'ai lu Foucault" in *Michel*

Foucault: Cahier de L'Herne 95, eds. P. Artières, J.-F. Bert, F. Gros and J. Revel (Paris: L'Herne, 2011). We would like to thank the author, editors and publisher for their permission to publish an English translation of the article.

Frédéric Gros, "Deleuze's Foucault: A Metaphysical Fiction," translated by Samantha Bankston, was originally published as "Le Foucault de Deleuze: Une Fiction Métaphysique" in *Philosophie* 47 (1995), 53–63. We would like to thank the author and the publisher for their permission to publish an English translation of the article.

Paul Rabinow, "Foucault and Prisons", originally appeared in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975– 1995*, revised edition; ed. David Lapoujade; trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York and Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), 277–86. Reprinted with the permission of the publishers.

Introduction: Between Deleuze and Foucault[1]

Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail
and Daniel W. Smith

Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault are widely accepted to be central figures of post-war French philosophy. Foucault (1926–84) held a chair in the History of Systems of Thought at the prestigious Collège de France, and remains one of the most-cited authors in the humanistic disciplines. Deleuze (1925–95), who taught at the University of Paris-St Denis until his retirement in 1987, authored more than twenty-five books, and was one of the most important and influential European philosophers of the post-war period. Cultural theorists, historians, philosophers and others have devoted considerable effort to the critical examination of the work of each of these thinkers, but despite the strong biographical and philosophical connection between Foucault and Deleuze, very little has been done to explore the relationship between them. This is the first edited volume to address this critical deficit with a rigorous comparative discussion of the work of these two philosophers.

Deleuze's Course Lectures on Foucault

In particular, this edited volume is motivated by the recent (2011) online publication of Gilles Deleuze's course lectures on Michel Foucault (1985–6) at the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (French National Library) in Paris. The BNF collected the available recordings of Deleuze's seminar lectures at the University of Paris VIII and converted them into digital files. Needless to say, the task was a painstaking one, but the MP3 files have now been made accessible online through the Gallica search engine at the library (gallica.bnf.fr).

When Foucault died in 1984, Deleuze was so affected by the death of his friend that he began lecturing and writing a book on him immediately. When asked why he wanted to write such a book, Deleuze was quite clear: "it marks an inner need

of mine, my admiration for him, how I was moved by his death, and his unfinished work."[2] Deleuze's desire for some kind of reconciliation with Foucault seems to have been a mutual one. According to Didier Eribon, one of Foucault's most heartfelt wishes, knowing that he would not live long, was to reconcile with Deleuze.[3] After speaking at Foucault's funeral, Deleuze's book project on Foucault began as a lecture series given at the University of Paris VIII, between 1985 and 1986. But these lectures were not merely a scholarly commentary on Foucault's work. They were, in the words of Frédéric Gros, "[a] means [of] discovering the founding principles, [and] laying bare the inherent metaphysics of [Foucault's] thought."[4] "It is amazing to see," Gros admits in an interview with François Dosse, "how Deleuze, who couldn't have had any knowledge of the Collège de France lectures, was so accurate in his interpretation."[5]

From 1985 to 1986, Deleuze gave a weekly seminar on Foucault, every Tuesday, at the University of Paris VIII. The seminars were scheduled for two hours but often lasted three or even four hours, and functioned as a kind of laboratory in which Deleuze would experiment with the ideas and concepts he was in the process of developing. Some of these eventually made their way into his book on Foucault, but there are many analyses that find no parallel in his published book, *Foucault*. For this reason, some of the most innovative philosophical scholarship on Foucault can be found in these lectures.

For example, while Deleuze's published book on Foucault is approximately 40,000 words long, his transcribed lectures on Foucault are over 400,000 words long. On 8 April 1986, Deleuze gave a three-hour seminar that developed an original conception of Foucault's concept of biopower through a wide-ranging reinterpretation of the Foucauldian corpus. The seminar is a *tour de force*, and clarifies the enigmatic relationship of Deleuze's concept of "control societies" with Foucault's concept of biopower, that scholars have struggled with for years. However, in his published book on Foucault that was the result of these seminars, the analysis of this entire seminar was compressed into scarcely more than a single page that never even mentions the word "biopower."[6] It would be difficult, even for philosophically informed readers, to discern the breadth of the original analysis from the summary presented in the book. Indeed, Deleuze's published book on Foucault is simply a précis of the more detailed material presented in the seminars.

We believe that these lectures offer an incredible contribution to both Deleuze and Foucault studies and an opportunity to formally reflect (in this edited volume) on the relationship between two of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. In addition to this edited collection we applied for and received two grants in 2011 to form a team to undertake a transcription of Deleuze's seminar on Foucault. The transcriptions were completed by Annabelle Dufourcq in 2013 and are now available on the Paris VIII website. In conjunction with the transcription project, we organized an international conference entitled "Between Deleuze and Foucault" in

November 2012, and again in November 2015. We are now currently working on an English translation of our transcriptions. It is our hope that Deleuze's lectures and this edited volume will prompt a critical revaluation of the philosophical connection between Foucault and Deleuze.

Between Deleuze and Foucault

The relationship between Foucault and Deleuze, however, is as strong as it is disparate: it is perhaps best described as a parallelism. As Deleuze says, "I never worked with Foucault. But I do think there are a lot of parallels between our work (with Guattari) and his, although they are, as it were, held at a distance because of our widely differing methods and even our objectives."[7] While the two were drawn together through their novel readings of Nietzsche, their commitment to a non-teleological theory of history, their activism in contemporary politics (with prisons, '68, Palestine, etc.), their return to the stoics, and a theory of the event, Deleuze and Foucault were often decisively divided in their methods and motivations.

For example, what is the difference between Deleuze's concept of desire and Foucault's concept of pleasure? Why were the two authors so opposed to the other's choice in terminology? Is the difference semantic or is there a really an important philosophical difference between them? If both the concepts of desire and pleasure are meant to be radical departures from the psychoanalytic notion of desire as lack, why does Deleuze choose to stick with the psychoanalytic word "desire" and Foucault with the more amorphous term "pleasure"? This divergence is clearly manifest in a letter Deleuze wrote to Foucault: "I cannot give any positive value to pleasure, because pleasure seems to me to interrupt the immanent process of desire. . . . From my point of view, this is precisely how desire is brought under the law of lack and in line with the norm of pleasure."[8] This divide is also noticeable from Foucault's side. In an interview recently translated by Daniel W. Smith and Nicolae Morar, Foucault emphasizes this very problem.

> I believe the problem of "pleasure-desire" is currently an important problem. I would even say that it is *the* problem that has to be debated in this re-evaluation – this rejuvenation, in any case – of the instruments, objectives, and axes of the struggle . . . Deleuze and Guattari obviously use the notion in a completely different way. But the problem I have is that I'm not sure if, through this very word, despite its different meaning, we don't run the risk, despite Deleuze and Guattari's intention, of allowing some of the medico-psychological presuppositions [*prises*] that were built into desire, in its traditional sense, to be reintroduced. And so it seems to me that, by using the word pleasure, which in the end means nothing, which is still, it seems to me, rather empty of content and unsullied by possible uses – don't we have here . . . a means of avoiding the entire psychological and medical armature that was built into the traditional notion of desire?[9]

Deleuze similarly expressed concern over the concepts of truth and subjectivity. As Jacques Donzelot recalled, "Deleuze often spoke to me about that, saying: 'Jacques, what do you think, Michel is crazy, what is this old idea about truth? He's taking us back to the old idea of truth-telling! I can't believe it!" Deleuze, in a letter to Foucault, continues, "The danger is: is Michel returning to an analog of the 'constituting subject' and why does he feel the need to resuscitate the truth even if he does make it into a new concept?"[10]

Consider too Foucault and Deleuze's divergent concepts of apparatus (*dispositif*) and assemblage (*agencement*). Both concepts seem to be aiming to replace structuralist concepts of organization with the assembly of heterogeneous elements, but why have they chosen such different terms/methods to do so? Again, are these real philosophical differences that are mutually exclusive? Are they strategic choices relevant in a certain axis of struggle, or are they terminological differences disguising philosophical homologies? While there has been much written on both concepts, very few scholars have taken the time to clarify the differences and similarities between these two concepts in depth and in relation to their original French meanings.

Even, and perhaps especially, in terms of politics, Foucault and Deleuze seem so similar and yet so different. Foucault's concept of biopower (the statistical political control over life itself) and Deleuze's concept of societies of control (post-disciplinary forms of modulated and flexible control) seem to both be offering new concepts of post-institutional/ disciplinary political power. However, Foucault and Deleuze choose very different methods of analysis (genealogy vs schizoanalysis) and have different motives for doing so (to understand the emergence of liberalism vs to understand the schizophrenic breakdown of contemporary capitalism). How have these approaches shaped the alternatives that Foucault and Deleuze then propose (ethical self-transformation vs revolutionary nomadism)? Why does Foucault, in his later work, then turn to a revitalization of the concept of the subject, a term Deleuze rarely uses, except in his book on Foucault? If Foucault was against the use of the word desire because of its historical overdetermination, why now does he return to the terminology of the subject and self?

The convergences and differences between Foucault and Deleuze on these topics and others are further complicated by a third body of literature: the one they wrote about each other's work. Foucault wrote *Theatrum Philosophicum* (1970) as a review of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *Logic of Sense* (1969) where he made the oft cited claim that "perhaps, one day, this century [the twentieth] will be called 'the Deleuzian century.'"[11] The two also recorded a conversation entitled "Intellectuals and Power" (1972), later publishing it in the journal, *L'Arc*. After Foucault's death, Deleuze, of course, published his book, *Foucault* (1986) soon after. Deleuze also wrote several articles on Foucault, "Breaking Things Open, Breaking Words Open," "Life as a Work of Art," "A Portrait of Foucault," as well as a private letter to Foucault, delivered by François Ewald in 1977, titled, "Desire and Pleasure"

(1994). These writings clarify some issues while multiplying and deepening others. Above all, they express a deep admiration and complex philosophical friendship whose implications have yet to be fully explored.

A Philosophical Friendship

In addition to their philosophical similarities and differences, it is also important to reflect on the nature of the friendship between Foucault and Deleuze. Together, Deleuze and Foucault launched a French revival of Nietzsche against phenomenology. In 1977, they helped co-edited Nietzsche's complete works for Gallimard;[12] they attended a major Nietzsche conferences together (1964);[13] and they were both friends of Pierre Klossowski, who dedicated his book *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* (1969)[14] to Deleuze and *The Baphomet* (1965)[15] to Foucault.

Both Deleuze and Foucault were political activists together in the Prison Information Group (GIP). As Judith Revel interestingly suggests in an interview with François Dosse: "Foucault took experience and practices [from the GIP] as his point of departure and conceptualized from there. Deleuze and Guattari invented war-machines then tried them out."[16] Whereas Foucault wrote *Discipline and Punish* only after the GIP, Deleuze and Guattari became interested in the decentralized non-representational structure of the GIP only after writing about these themes in *Anti-Oedipus*. In each case the GIP gave birth to a whole new relation between intellectuals and power for both Deleuze and Foucault. "A theorizing intellectual, for us," they say "is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness."[17] Their involvement in the GIP, according the Deleuze's seminar on Foucault, was not at all an "academic critique of representation," but as a specifically "practical critique of representation,"[18] that supported a "non-centralized movement" that "we both" saw as an extension of the events of May 1968.[19]

But the friendship between Deleuze and Foucault is also marked by a long silence: during the last eight years of Foucault's life, Deleuze and Foucault did not speak to each other. Why? Perhaps it was because when Foucault and Deleuze both demonstrated against the deportation of the Baader–Meinhof group's attorney Klaus Croissant from France, Foucault refused to sign the petition because he wanted to more carefully define his support for Croissant? [20] Perhaps it was because Deleuze hated the *nouveaux philosophes*, whereas Foucault supported them? Perhaps it was because Deleuze supported Mitterrand's Socialist presidency, but Foucault thought it was best to criticize them, just as one would criticize any other party in power? Or perhaps it was because "Foucault didn't like *Anti-Oedipus*," as Jacques Donzelot claims.[21] Or perhaps, it was the infamous letter Deleuze wrote to Foucault criticizing his concept of pleasure in the *History of Sexuality*? Or perhaps, as Deleuze says, in a 1990 interview with James Miller, when asked directly about his and Foucault's mutual silence:

(1) There's obviously no single answer. One of us could have answered one way one day and another way the next. Not because we are fickle. But because there are many reasons in this area and no single reason is "essential." And because none of them is essential, there are always several answers at once. The only important thing is that I had long agreed with him philosophically and on specific occasions, I no longer made the same evaluations as he did on several points at once. (2) This didn't lead to any "cooling" of relations between us, or to any "explanations." We saw each other less often, as if by the force of circumstances. And from there on, it became more and more difficult to meet up again. It is strange, we didn't stop seeing each other because we didn't get along, but because we weren't seeing each other any more, a kind of incomprehension or distance between us took hold. (3) I can tell you that I constantly miss seeing him, increasingly so. So what stopped me from calling him? That's where a deeper reason comes into it. Rightly or wrongly, I believed that he wanted greater solitude, for his life, for his thinking; that he needed this solitude, keeping in touch only with the people who were close to him. I now think that I should have tried to see him again, but I think I didn't try out of respect. I am still suffering from not having seen him again, even more so because I don't think there were any external reasons.[22]

On the Composition of this Volume

With the growing interest in Foucault's recently translated course lectures at the *Collège de France* (1973–84), and our recent transcription of Deleuze's course lectures on Foucault, released by the *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (2011), the editors of this volume believe that the time is ripe to address the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze directly. We have taken the cue for our title from Paul Patton and John Protevi's 2003 book *Between Deleuze and Derrida*.[23] Like this earlier volume, our collection of essays brings together both senior and junior scholars from diverse backgrounds to clarify the implications of an ongoing important philosophical encounter that took place between two of the greatest French thinkers of the post-war period.

The volume is divided into four sections. The first section stands apart in that it contains two texts in which Foucault and Deleuze directly commented on each other's work. Foucault's essay "Theatrum Philosophicum" was published in 1970 in the influential French journal *Critique*.[24] It contains the famous comment that "perhaps one day, this century will be known as Deleuzian," but this oft-cited soundbite can conceal the depth of Foucault's engagement with two of Deleuze most important yet difficult texts: *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of Sense*. Deleuze's piece entitled "Michel Foucault's Main Concepts" is an article that Deleuze wrote in 1984 immediately after Foucault's death, but left unpublished. Instead, Deleuze decided to devote his 1985–6

seminar to Foucault's work, which resulted in the publication of his book *Foucault* in 1986. The article, which was not published until 2003,[25] shows that the broad outlines of Deleuze's reading of Foucault were already in place, although some of the material in the article finds no parallel in the 1986 book. These two primary texts are supplemented by François Dosse's analysis of the complex friendship between Foucault and Deleuze, as well as Antonio Negri's account of the context in which he himself first read and appropriated Foucault's writings.

The middle three sections form the substance of the volume and contain articles by an array of prominent scholars organized around three fundamental themes: methodology and the notion of critique; convergences and divergences between Foucault and Deleuze; and the concepts of desire, power, and resistance. The volume concludes with an appendix containing the text of an interview that Paul Rabinow conducted with Deleuze shortly after Foucault's death, prefaced by Rabinow's own recollections of the context of the interview and an analysis of its content.

The editors would like to thank the each of the scholars who have contributed to this book for their extraordinary work as well as their unflinching support. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Samantha Bankston, Alex Feldman, and Kristopher Klotz, who translated several of the essays in the volume, superbly and at short notice. Carol MacDonald, at Edinburgh University Press, is a meticulous yet accommodating editor, and it has been a pleasure to be able to rely on her steady hand and keen eye during the production of the volume.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this essay was published as "Introduction," *Foucault Studies*, Special Issue on Foucault and Deleuze, 17 (April 2014): 4–10.
2. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 94.
3. François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 328.
4. Frédéric Gros, "Le Foucault de Deleuze: une fiction métaphysique," *Philosophie* 47, (September 1995), 54.
5. Frédéric Gros, "Interview with François Dosse," in Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari*, 327.
6. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Seán Hand (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 84–5.
7. Gilles Deleuze, "Fendre les choses, fendre les mots" [1986], in *Pourparlers* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), 117.
8. Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in *Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975–1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2006), 131.
9. Michel Foucault, "The Gay Science," trans. Nicolae Morar and Dan Smith, *Critical Inquiry* 37:3 (Spring 2011), 385–403. In his letter, Deleuze mentions an earlier encounter

with Foucault when Michel told him, "I cannot bear the word desire; even if you use it in another way," in Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure."

10. Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 318.
11. Foucault made this remark in his 1970 essay on Deleuze, "Theatrum Philosophicum," which is included in *The Essential Works of Foucault, Vol. 2, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Roburt Hurley and others (London: Penguin Press, 1998), 343, translation modified.
12. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Œuvres philosophiques complètes*, ed. Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 1977).
13. Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 307.
14. Pierre Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
15. Pierre Klossowski, *The Baphomet*, trans. Sophie Hawkes and Stephen Sartarelli (Hygiene, CO: Eridanos Press, 1988).
16. Judith Revel, "Interview with François Dosse," in Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 313.
17. Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 312.
18. Gilles Deleuze, *Paris VIII Foucault Seminar*, BNF audio archives, 7 January 1986.
19. Ibid.
20. This hypothesis is further developed by Paul Patton in "Activism, Philosophy, and Actuality in Deleuze and Foucault," *Deleuze Studies*, vol. 4, 2010, supplement, 84–103, especially 85.
21. Jacques Donzelot, "Interview with François Dosse," in Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari*, 315.
22. Gilles Deleuze, "Letter to James Miller (7 February 1990)," in James Miller, *Michel Foucault* (Paris: Plon, 1993), 346.
23. Paul Patton and John Protevi (eds.), *Between Deleuze and Derrida* (London and New York: Continuum, 2003).
24. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum philosophicum," in *Critique* 282 (November 1970), 885–908.
25. Gilles Deleuze, "Sur les principaux concepts de Michel Foucault," in *Deux régimes de fous: Textes et entretiens 1975–1995*, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2003), 226–46.

Part I

Encounters

Chapter 1

Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship

François Dosse

"Perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian."[1] Michel Foucault's lucid remark, made in 1969, has often been repeated. As for Deleuze, "Gilles deeply admired Michel Foucault."[2] Although they saw each other frequently and fought alongside each other for the same political causes, they never really worked together. Yet as the final tributes were being paid to Foucault at La Salpêtrière before a crowd of several hundred mourners, it was Deleuze who stood and read an excerpt from the preface to *The Use of Pleasure*. Some basic disagreements were surely motivated by a certain rivalry as to who incarnated the authority of critical thinking, at least so far as Foucault was concerned, according to Paul Veyne, a close friend of his. "I got the feeling that Foucault saw Deleuze as a rival."[3] Foucault was exasperated to see Nietzsche's works linked so closely to Deleuze's reading and teased Veyne, telling him that what he really liked in Nietzsche was "Deleuze's Nietzsche."[4]

Deleuze, however, was not jealous of Foucault, toward whom he always claimed some closeness. "I never worked with Foucault. But I do think there are a lot of parallels between our work (with Guattari) and his, although they're as it were held at a distance because of our widely differing methods and even our objectives."[5] Regarding their putative rivalry, "I'll say this: the fact that Foucault existed, with such a forceful and mysterious personality, the fact that he wrote such wonderful books, with such style, has never caused me anything but delight."[6] For Deleuze, any rivalry toward Foucault, for whom he felt only admiration, was unimaginable. "Perhaps we met too late. I respected him deeply. The atmosphere changed when he came into a room. There was something different in the air. Things changed. It was atmospheric. Something emanated from Foucault. Foucault's gestures were astonishingly sharp and elegant."[7]

Their story starts in October 1952, in Lille. Deleuze and his friend Jean-Pierre Bamberger were teaching at Amiens High School at the time and attended a lecture

by Foucault, who was giving a psychology course at the University of Lille. In the early 1950s, Foucault was quite close to the French Communist Party and Deleuze was on target: "What I heard quite clearly reflected a Marxist perspective."[8] At the end of the conference, Bamberger invited them both to dinner at his place. Their first meeting was icy; it seemed unlikely that they would meet again.

They met again in 1962; it had taken ten years. At that point, Foucault was a professor at Clermont-Ferrand and was finishing his *Raymond Roussel* and *The Birth of the Clinic*. Deleuze had just published *Nietzsche*, which Foucault had liked very much. As Jules Vuillemin had been elected to the Collège de France, a position opened up at the University of Clermont-Ferrand. Foucault suggested that Deleuze might replace Vuillemin; Deleuze came to Clermont and spent the day with Foucault, whom he had not seen since the dinner in Lille. "The meeting went very well, and everybody was happy. The philosophy department approved Deleuze's appointment unanimously and Vuillemin got it approved by the faculty board in a unanimous vote."[9] The promise of collaboration between Foucault and Deleuze within the same philosophy department was stillborn, however, as the Ministry of Universities had already decided to appoint Roger Garaudy, a high-ranking French Communist Party and Politburo member. During this period, Deleuze was posted at the University of Lyon, and he and Foucault opposed Garaudy, a shared position that brought them closer to one another. "They saw each other regularly when Deleuze traveled to Paris. And without really becoming intimate, they were friendly enough for Foucault to lend his apartment to Deleuze and his wife when he was away."[10]

In the early 1960s, Foucault and Deleuze were working together for Gallimard on an edition of Nietzsche's complete works, which profoundly changed the way Nietzsche had been read in France until then.[11] Both men also participated in one of the most important occasions of the "return to Nietzsche": the 1964 conference at Royaumont. Both were close to Pierre Klossowski, who had translated *The Gay Science* in 1954; this was their first major meeting in a philosophical undertaking. Deleuze had met Klossowski through Marie-Magdeleine Davy's circle during the war. When Klossowski published *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* in 1969, he dedicated it to Deleuze, in homage to his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

Both Deleuze and Foucault worked on Klossowski individually, and each discovered a common object of inquiry inspired directly by his writings.[12]

Both philosophers saw in Klossowski's work an extension of the tradition of transgressive literature, crossing fiction with philosophy along the lines of a simulacrum. "The paradoxical *mimesis* that both actualizes and exorcizes makes the simulacrum the point where the relationship between the profane and sacred is inverted."[13] It was important to question the false identity of things and beings by breaking them open in the ways made possible by the simulacrum and the proliferation of masks. Here,

the Foucauldian theme of the death of man, which had made *The Order of Things* a success and a scandal, came to the fore. "Klossowski's entire work moves toward a single goal: to assure the loss of personal identity, to dissolve itself."[14] Foucault and Deleuze thus consolidated their Nietzscheism – or anti-Hegelianism – using the simulacrum as a war-machine against thought based on identity and representation. Deleuze admired Klossowksi's last novel, *The Baphomet* (dedicated to Foucault), which provided a way out of the moral and theological dilemma between Good and Evil by showing that the two systems are not alternatives but simultaneous, constituting "a grandiose sequel to Zarathustra."[15]

Separately – Deleuze was in Lyon, and Foucault was in Sidi Bou Saïd in Tunisia – both were enthusiastic about May '68. In his seminar on Foucault, Deleuze insisted on the importance of the event for understanding the issues in Foucauldian philosophy, which are theoretical and practical. In 1986, recalling this founding event, Deleuze pointed out its international importance and its contagious energy, which was as hard to describe as to imagine in the desert of the 1980s.[16] For Deleuze, calling into question the various forms of centralization was the agent of this rupture.

During the summer of 1968, when the creation of a university at Vincennes was being considered, Foucault was designated to create the philosophy department. He quite naturally contacted Deleuze, who had to decline temporarily for reasons of ill health. Deleuze was publishing *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* at the time, which Foucault greeted as a philosophical revolution. He was enthused by what he described as a "bolt of lightning that will be named Deleuze: a new way of thinking is possible; thought is possible once more. It does not lie in the future, promised by the most distant of new beginnings. It is here in Deleuze's texts, springing forth, dancing before us, in our midst; genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, a-categorical thought."[17] As early as 1969, Foucault had clearly understood Deleuze's philosophy as first and foremost a "philosophy of the event," as François Zourabichvili later demonstrated.[18] Foucault showed how the fundamental question posed by Deleuze is that of knowing what thinking is, situating thought within the "affirmative disjunction"[19] of the event and the phantasm. As if echoing Foucault, Deleuze concluded his seminar on 20 May 1986, with the remark, "Only one thing has ever interested Foucault: what does it mean to think?"[20]

The Prison Information Group Adventure

In the early 1970s, their philosophical proximity extended to politics when Foucault created the Prison Information Group (GIP), which Deleuze joined shortly thereafter. The GIP was born out of the dissolution in May 1970 of the GP (Proletarian Left) by Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin. The ruling party was hardening its repressive policy regarding left-wing agitation in the post-1968

period and imprisoning several of the group's militants, including Alain Geismar. In September 1970, the imprisoned militants began a twenty-five-day hunger strike to be granted political-prisoner status, but the strike failed. In January 1971, they began a new hunger strike that elicited greater public support.

Alfred Kastler, Paul Ricoeur and Pierre Vidal-Naquet requested an audience with Minister of Justice René Eleven and were promised a commission to rule on the conditions of imprisonment. Finally, after thirty-four days without food for some, "the lawyers Henri Leclerc and Georges Kiejman, in a press conference at the Saint-Bernard chapel on 8 February 1971, announced the end of the hunger strike"[21] and the creation of a special detention regimen for the prisoners. During the press conference, three well-known intellectuals, Michel Foucault, Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Jean-Marie Domenach, the director of the journal *Esprit*, announced the creation of the GIP. Initially, the group grew directly out of the Maoist current of thought to protect GP militants being prosecuted by the government and given arbitrary sentences. The former GP members had in fact created a Political Prisoners Organization that was overseen first by Serge July and then by Benny Lévy, but the GP soon became independent.

Without having any prior consultation, Daniel Defert suggested Foucault's name to organize a committee to investigate the general situation in prisons. Foucault accepted, and "at the end of December, he brought together at his home the people he thought would be able either to create or to prepare a commission of inquiry into prisons."[22] The group quickly agreed on their method of inquiry. The lawyer Christine Martineau was finishing a book on work in prisons and, with the help of the philosopher Danielle Rancière, had already designed a questionnaire to distribute to the prisoners: "Our model was Marx's workers' survey."[23] In the end, thanks to Foucault, who was disappointed by the popular inquiries led by Maoist militants after 1968,[24] the plans for a commission of inquiry turned into the GIP. The GIP was entirely decentralized (one group per prison). Very quickly, this Parisian model gained ground in the provincial prisons to which the militants had been sent. As a form of organization, it immediately appealed to Deleuze for its practical and effective resistance and because it broke with all forms of centralized bureaucratic machinery, defining itself instead as a microstructure. "The GIP developed one of the only left-wing groups that worked without being centralized. . . . Foucault knew how not to behave like the boss."[25]

Using as an excuse the mounting tension since the September 1971 Clairvaux prison riots, which had culminated in a guard and a nurse being taken hostage by two prisoners, Buffet and Bontens, the Minister of Justice, decided to try to calm the anxious prison guards and punish the prisoners collectively by refusing to let them receive their Christmas parcels that year. The decision fueled further protests in the prisons: in the winter of 1971–2, thirty-two rebellions broke out, during some of which prisoners destroyed cells and occupied rooftops. On Christmas Eve,

the GIP organized a demonstration in front of the Santé Prison in Paris that both Foucault and Deleuze attended. Violent clashes broke out throughout the month of December, notably at the prison in Toul, where fifteen prisoners were wounded.

GIP intellectuals were occasionally asked to go to the provinces. In Nancy, for example, a riot had been strongly quelled and charges had been brought against six of the two hundred rioters. Deleuze, along with Daniel Defert, Hélène Cixous, Jean-Pierre Faye, Jacques Donzelot, among others, made the trip to join the protest demonstration. Foucault could not attend, having been arrested after helping an immigrant who was being beaten up in the metro. In Nancy's central town square, Jean-Pierre Faye was chatting with a journalist from *L'Est Républicain*, who was commenting on how uninteresting the demonstration was. Faye advised him to wait a few minutes longer before judging it. "As soon as I said those prophetic words, the cops rushed us."[26] Deleuze stood up on a bench to speak, was quickly cut off by the police, and said, "Since my boss isn't here, I'm going to speak in his place." As the police were charging, Deleuze was overcome by his respiratory problems and became seriously ill; he lay down on the ground and became semicomatose. Foucault's young friend Jacques Donzelot was extremely concerned and stayed with him. "When he came to, he said to me, 'Oh, are you here with me? How kind of you!'"[27]

At Paris VIII, when Donzelot defended his thesis on "Policing the Family"[28] – his thesis director was Jean-Claude Passeron – Deleuze proposed that he be part of the jury. "I suddenly got stage fright. I couldn't think of anything to say, so I just said, 'Why do I have to give a formal summary, since you've already read my work?' Deleuze stepped in, saying, 'Don't worry, I'll summarize your thesis for you.' Great!"[29] When the time came to publish the thesis, Deleuze offered to write the preface, but that caused tensions between Foucault and Deleuze. Donzelot had just defended a very Foucauldian thesis, and when he told Foucault that Deleuze was going to write the preface, he got a sharp reply. "I detest that sort of thing, I can't stand it when old men come and put their stamp on young people's work."[30] In the end, so as not to ruffle Foucault, Deleuze wrote an afterword instead of a preface.[31]

On 17 January 1972, the GIP managed to persuade Sartre and Foucault to demonstrate together at a protest against repression in prisons. A small group of public figures aimed to get inside the Ministry of Justice on Place Vendôme to hold a press conference. The cream of Parisian intelligentsia sat down in the ministry halls to listen to Foucault, who started to read the declaration made by the Melun prisoners. The police intervened half-heartedly as the demonstrators jeered and yelled "Jail Pleven!" or "Pleven's a murderer!" "The cops push harder. They get mad. Sartre resists. Foucault resists. Faye resists. Deleuze resists and can't stop laughing. But the cops end up winning and manage to throw all of us right back out onto the sidewalk."[32] Finally kicked out of the Ministry of Justice, which was now protected by a three-deep ring of armed and helmeted riot police, the press conference was held in the offices of the *Libération* press agency on rue Dussoubs.

Shortly thereafter, on 31 January 1972, Deleuze wrote a text entitled "What Our Prisoners Expect from Us" for the *Nouvel Observateur*.[33] He listed the prisoners' demands concerning the lifting of censorship, the disciplinary committee and disciplinary wards, using their labor and their conditional liberation, seeing the prisoners' statements as something completely new: not a "public confession" but a "personalized critique."[34] During the demonstrations, Foucault was especially attentive to Deleuze and worried about his health. On 16 December 1972, during confrontations with the police, Claude Mauriac was with Foucault and a small group just after a police charge. "Have you seen Deleuze? I hope he hasn't been arrested . . . That's how worried Michel Foucault was – he was very pale."[35]

Apart from the actions concerning prisons, the GIP also organized to protest acts of repression and racism. During the spring of 1971, the Jaubert affair broke. Alain Jaubert, a *Nouvel Observateur* journalist, was a witness to police violence during a demonstration by French West Indians. He was carted off in a police van and beaten up by the special service responsible for crowd control.[36] At a meeting chaired by Claude Mauriac, Foucault announced the creation of an investigative committee. A press conference was held on 21 June 1971. Denis Langlois spoke first, then Deleuze. "An initial group of questions starts with the communiqué released by the Prefecture of Police on May 30 . . . This communiqué is entirely unbelievable because it wasn't written to be believed. It has another goal – to intimidate."[37]

In the fall of 1971, a young Algerian manhandled the female concierge of his apartment building in Goutte d'Or. The concierge's husband saw it happen, retrieved his rifle, and killed the Algerian, claiming that it was an accident. The case cast the mounting racial tensions in the neighborhood into full light, and demonstrations were organized to denounce the racist murder. Foucault created a new investigative committee, whose members included Deleuze, Jean Genet, Claude Mauriac, and Jean-Claude Passeron, among others. On 27 November 1971, Sartre and Foucault led a meeting in the Goutte d'Or in the name of an "Appeal to the Workers of the Neighborhood" signed by Deleuze, Foucault, Michel Leiris, Yves Montand, Jean Genet, Sartre, and Simone Signoret.[38]

These militant actions in 1971 and 1972 gave Deleuze and Foucault an opportunity to start a dialogue about how they defined the new responsibilities of intellectuals with respect to power. It was during the 1972 interview that Deleuze used Guattari's formula: "We are all groupuscules."[39] For Deleuze, the GIP was the expression of a new type of organization that could renew the relationship between theory and practice, setting them in a more concrete, local, and partial framework. "A theorizing intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness."[40] Foucault similarly argued that the universal role of intellectuals as the incarnation of the discourse of Truth was over, because societal democratization allowed every social group to express its dissatisfactions perfectly

well without them. Rather, intellectuals should concentrate on the struggle against forms of power. Their job is to determine the various loci of power and to trace their genealogy.

Although the two friends grew closer during these years with respect to the political sphere, their ideas about political engagement were not exactly the same. "On one hand, Foucault took experience and practices as his point of departure and conceptualized from there. Deleuze and Guattari invented war-machines and then tried them out."[41] Thus Foucault, who spent time at Saint-Anne and was interested in psychiatry, created the GIP, then wrote *Discipline and Punish*, and worked on an analysis of power. Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, produced concepts and machines and then tested what they produced in social reality. Guattari's ideas were inscribed within a whole series of social practices linked to Marxism, institutional psychotherapy, and a series of research groups like the CERFI (Centre d'études, de recherches, et de formation institutionnelles), which were experimental sites for the concepts he had worked out with Deleuze.

Despite his reticence with respect to Guattari and his desire to remain at a distance from his groups, Foucault did let himself be persuaded by Deleuze to be involved in several issues of the CERFI's publications. He contributed to two issues of *Recherches: The Public Works of Power* and *Three Billion Perverts* in 1973.[42] At the same time, during the 1971–2 academic year, Deleuze participated in Foucault's seminar at the Collège de France, where Foucault was analyzing the nineteenth-century case of Pierre Rivière, who, at the age of twenty, slit the throats of his mother, brother, and sister and left behind his memoirs, which were partially published in 1836.

A Time of Discord

The other period when Foucault and Deleuze were both politically engaged came in 1977, during the Klaus Croissant affair. On 11 July 1977, the Baader–Meinhof gang's attorney came from Germany to Paris seeking political asylum: in his own country he was being treated as a Baader "agent" and as the terrorists' puppet. As soon as he arrived in Paris, the German authorities requested his arrest and deportation. On 30 September, the French police arrested him. The attorney Gérard Soulier, a friend of Guattari's who was very active in the CINEL (Centre d'Initiatives pour de Nouveaux Espaces Libres), learned of the arrest while reading *Le Monde* as he was about to drop off to sleep. "That woke me up!"[43] He leapt up from the couch, got out the legal directory, and called Jean-Jacques de Felice, Tubiana, and Antoine Compte, who organized a press conference with Henri Noguères, the president of the League for Human Rights. On 26 October 1977, Minister of Justice Alan Peyrefitte declared, "France cannot become a sanctuary for terrorists." In early November, a hearing was held in the tenth chamber of the Court of Appeal in Paris to rule on the request for deportation; on 16 November 1977, as a small crowd was

gathering in front of the Santé Prison along with Foucault and Deleuze, the police charged. Croissant was escorted to the German border.

By this point, the disagreements between the two friends were threatening their friendship. Both joined the demonstration against the deportation of Croissant, but Foucault refused to sign the petition, which already included the names of Deleuze and Guattari, since he thought it was too complacent with respect to the Red Army Faction terrorists and wanted to more carefully and specifically define his support to Croissant.[44] Claude Mauriac remembers calling Foucault "to ask him how he'd reacted to Guattari's phone call about the deportation request for Baader's attorney, Klaus Croissant. We'd had no prior discussion but had both refused to sign the text, agreeing on a definite *no* to deportation but refusing to take responsibility for what the text said about Germany."[45]

Years later, Foucault's American biographer, James Miller, asked Deleuze what had changed their friendship so irrevocably. On 7 February 7 1990, five years after Foucault's death, Deleuze gave a three-point response:

> (1) There's obviously no single answer. One of us could have answered one way one day and another way the next. Not because we are fickle. But because there are many reasons in this area and no single reason is "essential." And because none of them is essential, there are always several answers at once. The only important thing is that I had long agreed with him philosophically and on specific occasions, I no longer made the same evaluations as he did on several points at once. (2) This didn't lead to any "cooling" of relations between us, or to any "explanations." We saw each other less often, as if by the force of circumstances. And from there on, it became more and more difficult to meet up again. It is strange, we didn't stop seeing each other because we didn't get along, but because we weren't seeing each other any more, a kind of incomprehension or distance between us took hold. (3) I can tell you that I constantly miss seeing him, increasingly so. So what stopped me from calling him? That's where a deeper reason comes into it. Rightly or wrongly, I believed that he wanted greater solitude, for his life, for his thinking; that he needed this solitude, keeping in touch only with the people who were close to him. I now think that I should have tried to see him again, but I think I didn't try out of respect. I am still suffering from not having seen him again, even more so because I don't think there were any external reasons.[46]

This letter says a lot, but is also evasive. To better understand this radical break, we have to scrutinize several points of disagreement. In the first place, in 1977, Deleuze and Foucault had diametrically opposed positions regarding the new philosophers: Foucault supported them, but they were violently challenged by Deleuze.[47] In addition to the Croissant affair, they also diverged deeply on the Israeli–Palestinian question. Edward Said spoke with James Miller about this in November 1989. He saw the Middle East conflict as one of the major causes of their disagreement: he got the information from Deleuze himself, which Deleuze did not contradict when Miller put the question to him.[48] While Deleuze wrote a long article glorifying Yasser Arafat,[49] Foucault denounced the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism,[50] and in 1978, in the middle of the Lebanese crisis, he attacked the totalitarianism of Syria and the Soviet Union but spared Israeli politics.

In 1981, when the Socialists were voted into power in France, a new political disagreement arose. Deleuze was won over and even excited by the early days of Mitterrand's presidency. He thought it best to demonstrate goodwill and allow the Socialists to carry on with their work. Foucault thought it better to criticize them, just as one would criticize any other party in power, if not more so, because now the Communists had become part of Pierre Mauroy's government. When Jacques Donzelot met Deleuze for the last time, it was "in 1981, at the Panthéon. He was following Mitterrand. I ran into him; I was walking the other way. He said to me, 'What's happening is fantastic!' and I answered, no, that Mitterrand was a cynical politician who had been successful. He was thrilled!"[51] Their divergent judgments became obvious when General Jaruzelski staged a coup d'état in Poland in 1981, crushing the dreams of the *Solidarnost* leader Lech Wałęsa. Foucault and Bourdieu drafted an appeal criticizing the weaknesses of this new Socialist government in the face of a new Stalinesque show of strength. Deleuze was asked to sign but declined; he signed a different appeal written by Jack Lang and revised by Jean-Pierre Faye denouncing the repression in Poland while at the same time praising Mitterrand's acrions.

In addition to their political disagreements, Deleuze and Foucault also admitted their many philosophical differences, even if these could not account for the severance of their ties. After expressing great admiration for *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* when they were published, Foucault was perplexed by *Anti-Oedipus* in 1972. While he did write a preface to the 1977 American edition, in which he hailed *Anti-Oedipus* as the first ethical book to be written in a long time, according to Donzelot this was not a true reflection of Foucault's feelings about his friend's book. "Foucault didn't like *Anti-Oedipus* and told me so quite often."[52] Jacques Donzelot wrote his own enthusiastic critique for *Esprit*,[53] something that Foucault was glad not to have to do. For him, the book was "a language effect, like Céline. He [Foucault] took my paper to give it to an American journal, managing in that way to feel justified for not having written anything about it."[54]

In the first volume of his *History of Sexuality*, Foucault settled his accounts with psychoanalysis and with Lacan's theory of lack.[55] He argued against the Freudian conception of desire and strongly refuted the claim that society had become progressively repressive since the classical age. He demonstrated that, to the contrary,

discourses about sex were proliferating rather than slowly diminishing. Foucault's criticism of desire and "desirers" caught Deleuze and Guattari in the crossfire. In response, Deleuze wrote Foucault a personal letter that he sent through François Ewald, describing his arguments point by point – the letter was published as "Desire and Pleasure."[56] In it, Deleuze asked if it could be possible to consider as equivalent what pertained, for him, to the "body without organs-desires" and what pertained for Foucault to "body-pleasures." He recalled how virulently Foucault had rejected the concept of desire: "the last time we saw each other, Michel said very kindly and affectionately, something like: I can't stand the word desire; even if you use it differently, I can't stop myself from thinking or feeling that desire equals lack, or that desire is said to be repressed."[57] Deleuze, along the lines of Spinoza, saw pleasures as so many obstacles along the path of the desire to be, of *conatus* (striving), self-accomplishment, or perseverance in being, that could therefore only lead to loss. Pleasure, for him, interrupted the "immanent process of desire."[58]

Wounded by the letter, Foucault did not reply. He saw it as one more reason to break off their friendship. "Shortly afterward, Foucault abruptly decided that he would see no more of Deleuze."[59] To better understand why Deleuze's skepticism so offended Foucault, we need to bear in mind that despite the obvious and immediate public success of his book, which led to a reprint of twenty-two thousand copies after an initial print run of twenty-two thousand, and despite very favorable press reviews, Foucault's circle was disconcerted by the book's central argument questioning the battle against repression. It was hard to understand, after an entire decade of doing just this, how the battle on behalf of the freedom of sexual minorities could be viewed as a deployment of biopower. There were vocal criticisms and expressed incomprehension; Baudrillard's *Forget Foucault* was the final straw, so stunning the weakened philosopher that he abandoned the entire edifice that he had planned. It was only after seven years of silence, after having thoroughly revisited its premises, that he published the second volume of his *History of Sexuality*.

The question of desire was altogether central in the split with Deleuze; after all, questioning desire had initially brought them together.[60] Deleuze and Foucault both thought that Freud and Lacan had failed to really examine desire by reducing it to lack or interdiction. "But if the two philosophers were more closely aligned on behalf of a common cause than before, their differences still remain irreconcilable."[61] In 1983, Foucault was very clear about their disagreement during a long interview with Gérard Raulet, who asked him if he agreed with the idea that there was some similarity between his thought and Deleuze's. "Would this similarity extend to the Deleuzian conception of desire?" Foucault's succinct answer was categorical: "No, that's the point."[62] In fact, they gave different answers to a common line of inquiry. Both were concerned with building a non-fascist life ethic and agreed on the absence of naturalness and the spontaneity of desire ordered into arrangements, but Deleuze and Guattari saw desire as a concatenation

of arrangements within a decidedly constructivist perspective. "Deleuze's philosophical stroke of genius is to invent a new vitalism, to seek the conditions not of possibility but of reality between expression and construction."[63] What was also playing out in their different concepts of desire was the way that each appropriated Nietzsche, whom Deleuze used particularly for the way he addressed desire in *The Will to Power*; Foucault was more interested in the question of truth in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

Deleuze's conception of desire was rooted in Nietzsche and also strongly influenced by Spinoza's power of being. Deleuze introduced the power of being into an ontology. In January 1986, in his seminar on Foucault, Deleuze went back to the Foucauldian conception of desire/pleasure, explaining Foucault's refusal of the concept of desire and attachment to the idea of the body and its pleasures as the expression of a sexless sexuality with which he concluded his work *The Will to Knowledge*. According to Deleuze, the will to replace a "molar" conception with sex at its center by a "molecular" approach to multiform pleasures was inspired by Proust's definition of the three levels in *Sodom and Gomorrah*: the great group of heterosexual relations; a second level where same refers to same, man to man and woman to woman; and a third level that is "no longer vertical, but transversal,"[64] in which each man has a feminine aspect and each woman a masculine aspect that do not communicate with each other, whence the absolute need for four terms and molecular arrangements. Pulverizing the theme of guilt, Proust "even talks about local pleasures."[65]

The Truth

The publication of *The Will to Knowledge* created a new disagreement between Foucault and Deleuze about the return of the theme of truth. As Jacques Donzelot recalled, "Deleuze often spoke to me about that, saying 'Jacques, what do you think, Michel is completely nuts, what's this old idea about truth? He's taking us back to that old idea, veridiction! Oh, it can't be!'"[66] In his letter to Foucault, Deleuze explicitly voiced his concern about seeing this term return in Foucault's work. "The danger is: is Michel returning to an analog of the 'constituting subject' and why does he feel the need to resuscitate the truth even if he does make it into a new concept?"[67] For Foucault, it was not a question of revisiting the traditional confrontation between true and false. Talking with Paul Veyne one night about truth in Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Foucault added "literally (because I wrote his sentence down): the question is why truth is so little true?"[68] If it is indeed a question of arousing from its slumbers an old traditional concept, it is "to make it play on a different stage, even at the risk of turning it against itself."[69]

But in his 1977 letter, Deleuze expresses his sheer surprise concerning the means for Foucault's changing views. Starting from the idea that systems of power are, like those of counter-powers, bearers of truth, Foucault made the question of truth

depend on the question of power. Thus the "problem of the role of the intellectual in Michel's thought" was raised, along with "his way of reintroducing the category of truth, since, by completely renewing it and making it depend on power, he can find material in this renewal that can be turned against power. But here, I don't see how."[70] Trying to understand the Foucauldian use of the true in his 1985--6 seminar, Deleuze perceived a disjunction in Foucault's thought between the realms of seeing and of saying, the visible and the spoken. Starting from this paradoxical tension, the game of truth is played out, for speaking is not seeing. But both philosophers grant the two positions truth. Foucault ends up finding in the objective of truth the function of philosophy: "I can't see many other definitions of the word 'philosophy' besides that one."[71] By contrast, for Deleuze, the importance of an affirmation or a concept is not determined by the truth: "on the contrary, it's its importance and its novelty that determine its 'truth.'"[72]

Crossovers between Foucault and Deleuze exist on many levels: they often used the same authors and sources, but in different and often irreconcilable ways. For example, when Deleuze stopped writing portraits in the history of philosophy, he drew heavily from Stoicism for *The Logic of Sense.* Foucault also drew from Stoic arguments in his very late works. He had already allusively adopted the Stoic outlook of *The Logic of Sense* in stating that it was necessary that utterances be granted their specific "materiality," which would be something on the order of incorporeal materiality. Deleuze and Foucault also had a common enemy in Platonism and made use of the same aspects of Stoicism, such as the primacy of the event. "Foucault and Deleuze also emphasize that the Stoic art of the event seeks to insert the self into the immanence of the world and of time."[73] But they used the Stoics differently. Deleuze's was more of a philosophical history of philosophy wherein the Stoics shifted the entire way of thinking within which "philosophy gets confused with ontology."[74] Deleuze tended to look at the early Stoics, whereas Foucault favored the later Stoics of imperial Rome, the reputed moralists such as Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius.

For both of them, their relationship to the Greeks was mediated by Nietzsche; for Nietzsche, from the Greek age onward, the philosopher is he who affirms life. "The will to power in Nietzsche means the affirmation of life, and no longer judging life as the sovereign-Desire."[75] Foucault's interest in the Greeks in *The Use of Pleasure* was also derived from Nietzsche, but he put forward some very personal propositions: who could be the free man chosen to shepherd the civic community in the Greek city of antiquity? "Only he who knows how to govern himself is apt to govern others."[76] Deleuze identifies this as Foucault's central idea, which broke with his previous work: this government of self is removed from both knowledge and power to become a veritable "art of the self."[77] However, this strength of subjectification is not primary because it remains dependent on the singularity of the "Greek diagram."

Where Foucault and Deleuze used the Stoics in similar ways, they were also very different if we compare Deleuze's fundamentally affirmative and resolutely Spinozan philosophy and metaphysical approach and Foucault's fundamentally Kantian philosophy, integrating negativity occasionally to the point of skepticism. "For me, his books are great works of skepticism. That is where the truth of Foucault lies, in a modern skepticism linked to a quite mysterious form of engagement."[78] Spinoza was not unimportant to Foucault. "Daniel Defert told me that Foucault had used Spinoza, which was on his bedside when he died. He was in the process of rereading him."[79]

Just as Deleuze adhered closely to Spinoza in his idea of temporality or eternity proper to the *conatus* and eluding *chronos*, Foucault preferred just as strongly the practice of discontinuities and radical rents in the fabric of time. Here, Deleuze favored an ontology of ever-increasing power, whereas Foucault was closer to Kantian criticism. In his 1985--6 seminar, Deleuze remarked, "there is a neo-Kantianism peculiar to Foucault."[80] During what he called his "little promenade" through Kant, Deleuze paid vibrant tribute to Kant's insight, which he thought extraordinary.[81] According to Deleuze, Foucault found the Kantian gap in his manner of distinguishing between seeing and speaking, which were so different in nature that one could not be reduced to the other. If this gap could not be filled, how could knowledge exist? What Deleuze saw in this Kantian question was an analogy between Kant's situation of being caught between understanding and intuition and Foucault's grappling with the two heterogeneous dimensions of "visible" and "utterable."

Reversing their usual roles, while Deleuzian vitalism – considered dangerous – has often been contrasted with Foucault's neo-Kantianism and credited with being more respectful of established limits, Deleuze called Foucault's positions dangerous on several occasions. He explained what he meant. "Dangerous, yes, because there's violence in Foucault. An intense violence that he mastered, controlled, and turned into courage. He trembled with violence at some demonstrations. He saw what was intolerable. . . . And his style, at least up to the last books that achieved a kind of serenity, is like a lash, it's a whip twisting and relaxing."[82] Deleuze agreed with Paul Veyne that Foucault was a warrior ready to transform the history of thought into a war-machine, in a polemilogical approach fascinated by death. Deleuze, for his part, was more on the side of cunning, of ancient Greek intelligence, of the *Metis*, of laughter and a devastating sense of humor.

The Play of Mirrors

The philosopher Judith Revel observed the game of mirrors between two philosophers, each of whom went his own way while touching on very similar themes at several moments in their exchanges, a relationship very strong but always oblique.

Both had a close relationship to history but each from a different position. The more Kantian Foucault posed the question of the conditions of possibility; Deleuze was concerned with the conditions of reality. In 1968 and 1969, Foucault was delighted to discover the foundations for a politics of difference in Deleuze's work, which echoed his quest for the figure of the other and alterity that had led to his 1961 *History of Madness*. He felt comforted in his positions; Deleuze allowed him to define a way out of structuralism that he would later disown but that he was still ardently defending in 1967. Both philosophers were fascinated by schizophrenia as a way of escaping binary structural codification. "The schizophrenic experience appeared to create a space for narratives that were also manuals for breaking down the code."[83]

In his lectures at the Collège de France in the early 1970s, Foucault developed the idea of the medicalization of society, of the psychiatrization of the social realm, and of the institutionalization of the uses of power, which needed to be countered by anti-institutional uses of knowledge. This position was not far removed from the arguments put forward by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* or from the use of institutional psychotherapy at La Borde.[84] Yet what appeared to be a common perspective was not one, in fact, because the horizon of Foucault's enquiry at the time was concentrated on the question of power, whereas Deleuze and Guattari were interested in the processes of subjectivization: group-subjects and collective subjects of enunciation. "Then Foucault turned his attention to subjectivization, which was the case in *Discipline and Punish*, and we thought that they would meet but they didn't."[85]

Judith Revel, who has studied the echoes between the thought of the two philosophers, vouches for the effects of their falling out in the late 1970s when Foucault got involved in ethical issues: "When you look at instances from 1977–1978 onward, there are no more references to each other. There's a real silence."[86] On the other hand, regarding the frequent use of spatial metaphors, Foucault and Deleuze, like most of their generation of intellectuals, were very close, which translated a sort of determination on their part to leave Hegelianism and the subjacent philosophy of history behind via spatiality and the logical patterns that it suggested: that of the plane of immanence for Deleuze and Guattari, with its strata and smooth spaces, holes and lines of flight, which enabled a cartography of phenomena. Foucault somewhat similarly defined the general history that he advocated as the possible deployment of a "space of dispersion."[87] As Deleuze emphasized, underlying Foucault's use of the terms genealogy and archaeology lies a geology, with its sheets, landslides and discordances. In fact, Deleuze defined Foucault as a "new cartographer." Of course, Deleuze and Foucault positioned themselves very differently with respect to history, as Deleuze said quite clearly in 1988: "We, Félix and I, always fancied a universal history, which he [Foucault] hated."[88]

Two Philosophies of the Event

Foucault and Deleuze both broke free from the philosophy of history in the sense of Hegelian-Marxist teleology to make way for a philosophy of the event. As far as their relation to history, historians and the archive was concerned, both were tireless in their different ways of pursuing the sudden appearance of something new, the momentary flashes that upset habits and ready-made thoughts. These moments of crystallization, which were so essential to understanding what was at stake in both social history and the history of thought, were revealed in periods of crisis and change, something that Deleuze himself said when discussing Foucault's work, beginning with its shifts and passages, which reveal moments of crisis whose traversing elucidated the tensions borne by thought between its virtual and actual states. In his attentiveness to the new, Foucault belonged to the French epistemological school of Bachelard and Canguilhem and to Nietzschean genealogy. Starting from this tradition, he advocates a discontinuist approach to time, favoring the radical breaks that he called *épistémè* for a while, although he abandoned the term after *The Order of Things*.[89]

Following Nietzsche, Foucault replaced the quest for temporal origins and causalities with a critical positivism seeking to identify discontinuities by describing their material potentialities. Second, he aimed to identify the singularity of events beyond their acknowledged finality. Finally, eventualization made it possible to make the figure of the conscious subject as well as its illusion of mastering time less important: "Effective history brings out the most unique characteristics and most acute manifestations of events."[90] Foucault contrasted the three Platonic modalities of history with his own deconstructive use of historical myths. History as recognition was replaced by the parodic use of reality, history as continuity by a destructive use of identity, and history as knowledge by a destructive use of truths. From this perspective, history as a total synthesis was seen as a trap, because, according to Foucault, "a possible task remains one of calling into question everything pertaining to time, everything that has taken shape within it, everything that resides within its mobile element, so as to make visible that rent, devoid of chronology and history from which time issues."[91]

Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the event emphasizes the way it appears suddenly as something new, as a beginning, as its own origin. In *Dialogues*, Deleuze speaks about a "surface flash."[92] In *What Is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari use Péguy's *Clio* to explain that there are two ways of thinking about the event – by recording its effectuation in history and its conditioning or by returning to it, situating oneself within it and passing through all of its components and singularities. In 1980, *A Thousand Plateaus* announced the importance of evenemential scansions, as each of the thirteen plateaus has an inaugural date: "History will never be rid of dates. It is perhaps economy or financial analysis

which better demonstrate the presence of the instantaneity of these derisory acts in a total process."[93]

This way of thinking about events was not a form of presentism. On the contrary, philosophy as the creation of concepts must break with its own period. It is fundamentally untimely and inactual according to the Nietzschean conception that Foucault shared. "Act against time, therefore upon time, and hope thereby to plant the seeds of a time to come."[94] Deleuze differentiated history from becoming. The creation of something new was always inactual and constituted a becoming, which certainly needed history and situations in order not to remain completely undetermined, but they elude it at the same time. Becoming breaks out of time and is never reduced to it.

This was the case for May '68, an event that Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault all experienced intensely. For all three, viewing it only as an historical moment when France was mired in social conflict would be to overlook its essential creativity. It defied the traditional approach of understanding history and even created its crisis. Deleuze and Guattari agreed with this position, since for them, history could not explain what happens. Time creates a crisis in causality beneath which lies a law of pure chance, rendering it ontologically secondary but negating it. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze challenges two approaches to the event: the essentialist Platonic perspective that subsumes the plurality of events under a single pure Event and the circumstantialist approach that reduces the event to a witnessed accident. He insists on the plurality of events as "jets of singularity"[95] and emphasizes that the event itself raises questions: "The event is problematic and problematizing in its own right."[96] In *The Fold*, Deleuze repeats Whitehead's question: "What is an event?" In his view, the event manifests itself as a vibration resounding with infinite harmonics in a vast series, like the rising of something new that is at once public and private, potential and actual, and marked by intensities.

Under these conditions, is it possible to develop a philosophy of the event and bind it within discourse? The event exceeds its discursive expression. Foucault, after *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, veered toward a genealogical program that, in *The Order of Discourse*, his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, overvalues the discursive level. He laid out a program for calling life, crime and madness into question by examining the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It was a matter of restoring "to discourse its character as an event"[97] following relations of discontinuity: "Discourses must be treated as discontinuous practices."[98] In this respect, Foucault presented himself as a contented positivist from *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) onward, concerned with investigating the enunciative foundation for itself, in its positive, actual existence.

Deleuze expresses this excess with respect to the articulation of the event by insisting on its singularity, referring to Duns Scotus and his concept of *haecceity*

to define its individuality. Two essential characteristics follow. First, the event is defined by the simultaneous coexistence of two heterogeneous dimensions in a time where future and past continually coincide and overlap while remaining distinct and indiscernible. Second, the event is what happened, so that its emerging dimension is not yet separated from the past, an intensity that comes and is distinguished simply from other intensities. The ideal event, as Deleuze defines it in *The Logic of Sense*, is therefore a singularity or a collection of singularities.

To think the event, Deleuze and Guattari believe that it must follow two distinct temporal modes. First, there is its coming into being within a state of affairs, in present circumstances where it partakes of a particular time frame called *Chronos*, by virtue of which it fixes things and people to some degree. But at the same time, the event cannot be reduced to its coming into effect, thus the need to envisage a second temporal dimension that Deleuze and Guattari call the time of *Aiōn*, a paradoxical eternity where something incorporeal and ineffectuable exceeds and opens onto the indefinite time of the event, a "floating line that knows only speeds and continually divides that which transpires into an already-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a simultaneous too-late and too-early, a some-thing that is both going to happen and has just happened."[99]

For Deleuze and Guattari, this insistence on the Event refers to the sphere of action according to the teachings of Spinoza's practical philosophy but also to those of the Stoics.[100] A Stoic path that, in an *élan vital*, consists in being worthy of what happens, of supporting and valuing every glimmer that might be contained in what happens: an event, a speed, a becoming. An *Eventum tantum* can be imperceptible yet change everything:

> Making an event however small is the most delicate thing in the world: the opposite of making a drama or a story. Loving those who are like this: when they enter a room they are not persona, characters, or subjects but an atmospheric variation, a change of hue, an imperceptible molecule, a discrete population, a fog, or a cloud of droplets. Everything has really changed. Great events, too, are made in this way: battle, revolution, life and death. . . . True Entities are events.[101]

Deleuze, Reader of Foucault

Throughout his career, Deleuze paid very close attention to Foucault's publications and regularly reviewed them. Notably, he wrote two studies in 1970 and in 1975, one on *The Archaeology of Knowledge* and the other on *Discipline and Punish*.[102] And more importantly, in the 1985–6 academic year, he devoted his entire course to Foucault, publishing *Foucault* the following summer.

That he devoted himself to Foucault's writings immediately after Foucault's death showed the strength of their relationship and Deleuze's struggle to mourn someone who was more than a friend. When asked why he wrote a book on Foucault, Deleuze's answer was quite clear: "It marks an inner need of mine, my admiration for him, how I was moved by his death, and his unfinished work."[103] Deleuze's way of mourning Foucault was to elucidate the particular logic of his thought by seeking its coherence through the crises, leaps and incessant displacements that it traversed. Following Martial Guéroult's views, Deleuze agreed that each text formed an integral part of the complete works of an author and none could be examined without that context. Everything needed to be conveyed and its logic and movement reconstructed. "A thought's logic is like a wind blowing us on, a series of gusts and jolts. You think you've gotten to port, but then find yourself thrown back out onto the open sea, as Leibniz put it. That's particularly true in Foucault's case."[104] Deleuze therefore retraced Foucault's evolution in his writing, finding both a profound unity and fundamental shifts. All of Foucault's work, according to Deleuze, is articulated around the distinction between seeing and speaking. He is fundamentally dualistic on this matter, deploying two mutually irreducible dimensions: "But for him, the primacy of statements will never impede the historical irreducibility of the visible – indeed, quite the contrary."[105]

Deleuze identified important evolutions in Foucault's work. Until the publication of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1969, the major question was that of knowledge. Then, with *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault started working on a new dimension – power. Deleuze wanted to understand what had led him to change from one register to another, suggesting that Foucault's problem was that of the double, and "the utterance is the double of something which is identical to it."[106] Knowledge being the integration of power relations, he therefore played from a double score, that of relations of force, composing power, and that of relations of forms, composing knowledge. Specific singularities arise therefore from an endogenous relationship between knowledge and power.

But this mirroring between knowledge and power leads to a dead end and requires a third axis to recreate a dynamics. Deleuze thought that this third axis was already present, though to a lesser degree, and that it became much more important in Foucault's later work and particularly in his last two books, with the study of modes of subjectification, mistakenly read as the return of the subject. This dimension of subjectification "was present in Foucault, but not as such, it was intermingled with knowledge and power."[107] The question was therefore one of finding out how power and knowledge attempt to take over this third axis of subjectification in order to reappropriate it. Deleuze locates the dynamic in Foucault's thought here, for "the more power tries to conquer subjectification, the more new modes of subjectification form."[108]

Deleuze often read the work of other philosophers through the prism of his own positions and preoccupations. Had he fathered another Deleuzian child in his *Foucault*? This seems to be the opinion of Potte-Bonneville, who sees Deleuze's text as the best introduction to Foucault, encouraging us to read and study his work further. But he also suspects it of hiding aspects of Foucault's thought. "Thus the question of history disappears completely, which is quite strange when discussing Foucault."[109]

When the Foucault specialist Frédéric Gros published a study of Deleuze's reading, he spoke of it as a "metaphysical fiction,"[110] for he did not recognize the Foucault that he knew at all, though he recalls that for Deleuze, understanding Foucault was not a question of providing a scholarly commentary of his work: "For Deleuze, understanding an author, in a way, means discovering the founding principles, laying bare the inherent metaphysics of their thought."[111] It would also mean being able to create an imaginary Foucault, to dream up a metaphysical double. Frédéric Gros does, of course, acknowledge the extraordinary coherence that Deleuze's reading of Foucault's work elucidates: "reading Foucault, Deleuze recognizes how he was marked by his reading of Bergson."[112] Since writing his review in 1995, Frédéric Gros has been able to measure the accuracy of some of the main lines of Deleuze's reading:

> Deleuze's book is a true philosophical work. Everything he says about the relationship between utterances and visibilities shows that he understood something very important, which I later heard in Foucault's last lectures at the Collège de France, that Deleuze could not have had. It was the idea that he was constructing a direct ethics by making correspondences between visible acts and *logoi*, utterances. It is amazing to see how Deleuze, who couldn't have had any knowledge of the Collège de France lectures, was so accurate in his interpretation.[113]

As Robert Maggiori wrote when Deleuze's *Foucault* came out, he does not "explain Foucault, because Foucault explains himself very well in his books, nor does he provide a commentary, of which there are already plenty. Like a miner who respects the rock that resists his pick but knows how to find the treasure in its veins, Deleuze mines Foucault's writings to extract the most productive elements of his thought."[114]

Death

The rumor began circulating in Paris during 1984. Foucault was very ill and nobody knew what was wrong with him, although a few people heard that he had been hospitalized. Deleuze was concerned for his friend, whom he had not seen since the late

1970s. "Two weeks before Foucault died, Deleuze called me. He was very worried and wondered if I had any news. 'Do you know what is going on? What has he got?' I didn't know anything except that he was in the hospital. Then Deleuze said, 'Maybe it's nothing. Foucault will leave the hospital and come and tell us that everything is all right.'"[115] According to Didier Eribon, one of Foucault's most heartfelt wishes, knowing that he would not live long, was to reconcile with Deleuze. They never saw each other again. The fact that Daniel Defert asked Deleuze to speak at Foucault's funeral was a sign of how much both men wanted to smooth over their differences, even beyond the separation of death.

Deleuze hated conferences but made an exception for his friend, participating in the international colloquium organized in January 1988 in homage to Foucault. His paper was entitled "What Is a *Dispositif*?"[116] In his lecture on Foucault, Deleuze referred to Foucault's death in the context of the value he gave to impersonal pronouns and his critique of linguistic personology. In *The Space of Literature*, Blanchot writes of death as an event, coming from beyond the body. "One dies. . ." Foucault reinterpreted this theme and "died according to his interpretation."[117] "Foucault was telling us something that concerned him directly,"[118] that death is not the indivisible, final limit defined by doctors and moralists. One is never done with death: "Foucault lived death like Bichat. That's how he died. He died by taking his place within the 'One dies' and in the manner of 'partial deaths.'"[119]

Beyond their differences and disputes, after the death of both men, can we reasonably speak about a "Foucault–Deleuzeanism"? It would be pointless to coin a term that might miss the singularity of both philosophers, eliminating their disagreements and producing some *faux-semblant* in the name of some ecumenical sterility. Rather, we will describe a "disjunctive synthesis" similar to the relationship between Deleuze and Guattari.

In addition to their shared philosophical heritage, they were also close in the way that they used literature, approaching it in a clinical fashion that set them apart from professional philosophers, whose work was most often limited to academic texts. In *The Logic of Sense*, Artaud's scream deconstructs Lewis Carroll's ingenious surface connections, and Deleuze finds Artaud at the very center of Foucault's inquiries. "The unthought as the double of thought, and at the very end of *The Order of Things*, Foucault reinterprets the theme of the double that he shares with Artaud, Heidegger, and Blanchot."[120] Here Foucault identifies an experience similar to Artaud's, who had reached within thought an element that could not be thought and that becomes a "vital impotence" for the writer.[121]

The theme of the double appears in one of Foucault's first books, written about Raymond Roussel, another writer.[122] On the distortion between seeing and saying, Foucault again finds his inspiration in literature. Roussel formulates the relationship to language, coupling it to the will to push words to their limits,

a tendency common to both Foucault and Deleuze. "Break things open, break words open."[123] One of Roussel's writerly strategies was to construct two sentences around a tiny difference that would fundamentally change the overall meaning.[124] For both Foucault and Deleuze, literature is neither an illustration nor a curiosity. It is valuable as an experiment, an act of creation – and since, for Deleuze, philosophy consists in creating concepts, literature accompanies it in its creative work.

We can see in this relationship between Foucault and Deleuze more than shared foundations; Deleuze allowed Foucauldian thinking to develop. Deleuze's "Postscript on Control Societies," published in 1990, follows from Foucault's work.[125] Deleuze, like Foucault, felt implicated by current events and wanted to conceptualize change. Deleuze starts with the historicization proposed by Foucault, who had delineated a model of society founded on sovereignty, in which power reveals itself as the capacity to inflict death. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France, a disciplinary model came into being according to the schema of "the great confinement," which led to the generalization of closed universes where discipline affected every part of the social body. Numerous prisons, barracks, schools and factories were built on the model of the Panopticon. The function of power was no longer to put people to death but to discipline their bodies, make them live, maximize their utility, and let them die.

Foucault had begun to perceive the emergence of a new model, one centered on biopower and the biopolitical control of populations and that seemed slightly out of step with disciplinary concepts. Deleuze began with Foucault's intuitions and expanded them. His 1990 article identified the advent of a new type of society, "societies of control," which emerged after World War II and ended with a general crisis of all forms of confinement: "It's simply a matter of nursing them through their death throes."[126] Deleuze's analysis, which he was already developing in his seminar on Foucault, was prophetic. In this management of life in all its shapes and forms, he rightly foresaw a whole new type of management, based on control and transformation of the legal subject. This legal subject is no longer limited to the person, as it was in the age of humanism, because it implied populations other than human, cereal crops as well as herds of cattle, sheep as well as poultry, and every other living being. In the age of control societies, the legal subject becomes the living, "the living within man."[127]

Imprisonment is no longer needed, "because we know that everybody will be on the highway at a given hour. Probability calculations are much better than prisons."[128] From the 1980s on, Deleuze notes the breakdown of the entire fabric of enclosure, particularly that of factories that were affected by temporary work, by working at home, and flextime. At school, there was less discipline but far more control: "Individuals become 'dividuals,' and masses become samples, data, markets, or 'banks.'"[129] These various transformations destroy the former rigidity of the

discipline to pave the way for the microchips and mobile phones that make it possible to constantly control each person, in an open space where outside and inside are no longer useful categories. "The key thing is that we are at the beginning of something new."[130] Fresh forms of subjectification and resistance to control needed new directions.

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum" (1970), in *Dits et écrits* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 2:76. English translation in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 165–97.
2. Fanny Deleuze, interview with the author.
3. Paul Veyne, interview with the author.
4. Ibid.
5. Gilles Deleuze, "Fendre les choses, fendre les mots" (1986), in *Pourparlers* (Paris: Minuit, 1990), 117, translated as "Breaking Things Open, Breaking Words Open," in *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 85.
6. Ibid. 117.
7. Gilles Deleuze with Claire Parnet, *L'abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (1988), three DVDs (Montparnasse: Arte Video, 1997).
8. Gilles Deleuze, quoted in Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 83.
9. Ibid. 162.
10. Ibid. 163.
11. See François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), chapter 7, "Nietzsche, Bergson, Spinoza: A Trio for a Vitalist Philosophy," 129–49.
12. Michel Foucault, "La prose d'Actéon" (1964), translated as "The Prose of Acteon" in *Aesthetics, Methods, Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1999); Gilles Deleuze, "Klossowski ou les corps-langages" (1965), translated as "Klossowski or Bodies-Language" in *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale; ed. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
13. Philippe Sabot, "Foucault, Deleuze et les simulacres," *Concepts* 8 (2004), 6.
14. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 283.
15. Ibid. 299.
16. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII seminar (28 January 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archives.
17. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Dits et écrits*, 2:98; *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 165–97.
18. François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: Une philosopie de l'événement* (Paris: PUF, 1994). English translation in François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*: together with *The Vocabulary of Deleuze*, trans. Kieran Aarons, ed. Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 33–136.

19. Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Dits et écrits*, 2:85; *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 185.
20. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII seminar (20 May 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archives.
21. Philippe Artières, Laurent Quéro and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, *Le groupe d'informations sur les prisons. Archives d'une lutte 1970–72* (Paris: IMEC, 2005), 28.
22. Daniel Defert, "L'émergence d'un nouveau front: les prisons," in *Le groupe d'informations sur les prisons*, 317. Around twenty people gathered at Foucault's home for the meeting, including Daniel Defert, Casamayor, Jean-Marie Domenach, Louis Joinet, Frédéric Pottecher, Christian Revon, Jean-Jacques de Felice, Christine Martineau, Danielle Rancière and Jacques Donzelot.
23. Ibid. 318.
24. Notably by the Bruay-en-Artois affair of 1972. Near the miners' quarters in Bruay, the naked, mutilated body of a teenage girl named Brigitte Dewèvre, a miner's daughter, was found. Pascal, the judge, quickly decided to charge the solicitor Pierre Leroy. The Maoist daily *La Cause de Peuple* considered that only a bourgeois pig could have committed such a crime and a popular tribunal was formed in the name of necessary popular justice.
25. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII seminar (28 January 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archives.
26. Jean-Pierre Faye, interview with the author.
27. Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
28. Jacques Donzelot, *La police des familles* (Paris: Minuit, 1977).
29. Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
30. Michel Foucault, reported by Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
31. Deleuze wrote a handsome afterword entitled "L'ascension du social." Gilles Deleuze, "L'ascension du social," afterword to Jacques Donzelot, *La police des familles*, 213–20. English translation: Gilles Deleuze, "The Rise of the Social," in Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families*, trans. Robert Hurley (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), ix–xvii.
32. Alain Joubert, *Michel Foucault, une journée particulière* (Lyon: Aedelsa Editions, 2004).
33. Reprinted in Gilles Deleuze, *L'île déserte et autres textes. Textes et entretiens 1953–1974*, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2002), translated as *Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–1974)*, trans. Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotexte, 2003), 204–5.
34. Ibid. 286.
35. Claude Mauriac, *Mauriac et fils* (Paris: Grasset, 1986), 388.
36. The companie républicaine de sécurité, or CRS.
37. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII archives, BDIC.
38. See Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*.
39. Gilles Deleuze, "Les intellectuels et le pouvoir," *L'Arc* 49 (4 March 1972), translated as "Intellectuals and Power" in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*.
40. Ibid. 289.
41. Judith Revel, interview with the author.

42. Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, chapter 15, "The CERFI at Work," 267–83.
43. Gérard Soulier, interview with the author.
44. Much later on it became known that this democratic figure and state attorney was, in fact, a Stasi agent.
45. Claude Mauriac, *Mauriac et fils*, 294.
46. Gilles Deleuze, letter to James Miller (7 February 1990). In James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (New York: Anchor Books, 1993), 298.
47. See Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, chapter 20, "The Year of Combat: 1977," 362–78.
48. Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, 449n41.
49. Gilles Deleuze, "Grandeur de Yasser Arafat," *Revue d'Études Palestiniennes* 10 (Winter 1984), 41–3. Reprinted in Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness, Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext, 2007), under the title "The Importance of Being Arafat," 241–5. For a more precise translation, see Gilles Deleuze, "The Grandeur of Yasser Arafat," trans. Timothy Murphy, in *Discourse* 20:3 (Fall 1998), 30–3.
50. Michel Foucault, *Le Monde* (17–18 October 1986). Reprinted in *Dits and écrits*, 2:96.
51. Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
52. Ibid.
53. See Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, chapter 10, "'Psychoanalysm' Under Attack," 183–205.
54. Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
55. Michel Foucault, *La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), translated as *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978).
56. Gilles Deleuze, "Désir et plaisir," in *Magazine Littéraire* 325 (October 1994), 59–65; reprinted in Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 122-34. A translation, by Daniel W. Smith, appears in this volume, 223–31, under the title "Desire and Pleasure."
57. Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in this volume, 227 (translation modified).
58. Ibid. 228.
59. Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, 297.
60. David Rabouin, "Entre Deleuze et Foucault: Le Jeu du Désir et du Pouvoir," *Critique* 637/638 (June–July 2000): 475–90.
61. Ibid. 485.
62. Michel Foucault, interview with Gérard Raulet, "Structuralisme et post- structuralisme," *Telos* 16:55 (Spring 1983), 195–211. Reprinted in Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, 4:445.
63. Eric Alliez, interview with the author.
64. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII seminar (21 January 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archives.
65. Ibid.
66. Jacques Donzelot, interview with the author.
67. Gilles Deleuze, "Désir et plaisir," in *Deux régimes de fous*, 113.
68. Paul Veyne, "Le dernier Foucault et sa morale," *Critique* 471/472 (August–September 1986), 940n1.

69. Hervé Couchot, "Philosophie et vérité: quelques remarques sur un chassé-croisé," *Concepts* 8 (2004), 29.
70. Gilles Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in this volume, 224 (translation modified).
71. Michel Foucault, introduction to his seminar at the Collège de France (11 January 1978), public recording, quoted in Couchot, "Philosophie et vérité," 39n1.
72. Couchot, "Philosophie et vérité," 43.
73. Thomas Bénatouil, "Deux usages du stoïcisme: Deleuze et Foucault," in Frédéric Gros and Carlos Lévy, *Foucault et la philosophie antique* (Paris: Kimé, 2003), 31.
74. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 179.
75. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (6 May 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archives.
76. Ibid.
77. Michel Foucault, *L'usage des plaisirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), 90, translated as *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume 2*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1985).
78. Matthieu Porte-Bonneville, interview with the author.
79. Judith Revel, interview with the author.
80. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar, Bibliothèque nationale de France audio archives.
81. "Kant is the first to have defined the human being in relation to the split which divides each one of us." Kant brought about the development of modern philosophy by differentiating two heterogeneous dimensions and by insisting on the irreducible disjunction between receptivity and spontaneity, between intuitions and concepts, and by making finiteness into a constitutive principle: "With Kant, something came to light which could not be seen beforehand." Ibid.
82. Gilles Deleuze, "Un portrait de Foucault," interview with Claire Parnet (1986), in Gilles Deleuze, *Pourparlers*, 140, translated as "A Portrait of Foucault" in Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 103.
83. Judith Revel, "Foucault lecteur de Deleuze: de l'écart à la différence," *Critique* 591/592 (August–September 1996), 734.
84. See Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, chapter 2, "La Borde: Between Myth and Reality," 40–54.
85. Judith Revel, interview with the author.
86. Ibid.
87. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1972), 10.
88. Gilles Deleuze, interview with Raymond Bellour and François Ewald, *Le Magazine Littéraire* (September 1988), 24.
89. "Necessarily, we must dismiss those tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions. We need to break into pieces everything that enables the consoling game of recognitions. Knowledge, even under the banner of history, does not depend on 'rediscovery' and it emphatically excludes the 'rediscovery of ourselves.' History becomes 'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being – as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our bodies and confronts

them with themselves . . . This is because knowledge is not made for understanding, but for cutting." Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, généalogie, histoire" (1971), in *Dits et écrits*, 2:147–8, translated as "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 154 (translation slightly modified).

90. Ibid.
91. Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 343, translated as *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1970), 331.
92. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet (1977) *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press), 80.
93. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 79. 20 November 1923 is linked to galloping inflation in Germany after 1918: "The curtain falls on 20 November 1923," wrote J. K. Galbraith in *Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went*, rev. ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1995).
94. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
95. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 53.
96. Ibid. 54.
97. Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 215–37: 220.
98. Ibid. 231.
99. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 262.
100. "Not being inferior to the event, becoming the child of one's own events." Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 62–3.
101. Ibid. 49.
102. Gilles Deleuze, "Un nouvel archiviste" (1970) and "Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe" (1975), revised versions printed in Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand (New York: Continuum, 2006), 11–30, 31–51.
103. Gilles Deleuze, interview with Didier Eribon (1986), in *Pourparlers*, 129, translated as "Life as a Work of Art" in *Negotiations*, 94.
104. Ibid.
105. Deleuze, *Foucault*, 43.
106. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (17 December 1985), French National Library sound archive.
107. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (6 May 1986), French National Library sound archive.
108. Ibid.
109. Mathieu Potte-Bonneville, interview with the author.
110. Frédéric Gros, "Le Foucault de Deleuze: une fiction métaphysique," *Philosophie* 47 (September 1995), 53–63.
111. Ibid. 54.
112. Ibid. 63.
113. Frédéric Gros, interview with the author.
114. Robert Maggiori, "Gilles Deleuze–Michel Foucault: une amitié philosophique," *Libération* (2 September 1986).

115. François Regnault, interview with the author.
116. Gilles Deleuze, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif?," in *Michel Foucault philosophe* (Paris: Seuil, 1989), 185–95, translated as "What is a Dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault Philosopher*, ed. and trans. T. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1991).
117. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (26 November 1985), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archive.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (22 April 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archive.
121. Ibid.
122. Michel Foucault, *Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond Roussel*, trans. Charles Ruas (New York: Doubleday, 1986).
123. Raymond Roussel, *Comment j'ai écrit certains de mes livres* (Paris: UGE 10/18, 1977).
124. For example, Roussel would generate from the sentence "Les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux billard [The white letters on the cushions of the old billiard table]" the punning and homonymic sentence "Les lettres du blanc sur les bandes du vieux pillard [Letters by a white man about the hordes of the old plunderer]." He would then write a story linking these two concepts.
125. Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on Control Societies," in *Negotiations*, 178.
126. Ibid.
127. Gilles Deleuze, Paris VIII Foucault seminar (8 April 1986), Bibliothèque nationale de France sound archive.
128. Ibid.
129. Deleuze, "Postscript on Control Societies," 180.
130. Ibid. 182.